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AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF AUTHOR

After two false starts in attempting my college education - one in 1968 due to
financial difficulties and the military draft, the other in 1972 caused by a family tragedy I left Idaho and moved to Montana. By 1978, I felt confident to try again. My stepfather,
a deputy-sheriff, inspired me to enter the field of education with a conversation we had
while fishing on the banks of the Clark’s Fork River. He said to me, “As much as you
like reading and history, why don’t you become a teacher?” I asked him why he thought
that. He replied, “Maybe you can get to them before I have to.”
I entered studies at Northern Montana College in Havre, Montana, graduating in
two-and-one-half years with a Bachelor of Sciences degree in history and social sciences
and only a few credits short of an added double major in language arts and literature.
While at NMC, I became editor of the college paper and was credited with several
articles printed in a local newspaper. These included in-depth interviews with candidates
running for the U.S. Senate. I had also begun writing some small pieces for local and
regional history publications.
While awaiting the start of the next school year, following graduation, and my
first teaching job, I took some classes in library sciences and guidance and counseling.
Little did I realize that as he looked upon my transcripts, the superintendent in Belfry,
Montana would assign me additional duties as the district librarian and K-12 counselor.
During the course of the 1980-81 school year, I drove 60 miles one-way three days a
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week to Eastern Montana College in Billings, and received my certification as a librarian
the next summer.
I transferred to the University of Montana in Missoula. While there, I worked the
summers of 1982-86 on a Masters in Counseling. I graduated with a Masters of
Education degree in School Guidance and Counseling in 1987.
From 1981 until 1991, I taught in three more small schools in Montana: Dodson,
Rosebud. and Lavina. While in these schools, none of which had more than 125 students
in the high school, I filled several teaching positions, often serving as history and English
teacher, counselor and librarian all in the same year. As might be imagined in small
schools, I also functioned at various times as student council advisor, honor society
advisor, speech and debate coach, drama coach, basketball coach, newspaper advisor, and
class advisor for all classes.
In 1991, I moved to Washington State. After a year of substitute teaching, I was
employed in Quilcene, located on the Olympic Peninsula. While in Washington, I
attended the University of Washington and the Pacific Northwest Writer’s Program, from
which I graduated in 1995. Since that time, I have published stories in several small
literary magazines.
I returned to Idaho in 2000 and obtained employment in the Kuna School District
in 2001. Also in 2001, I applied for admittance to the Graduate Program at Boise State
University. I made it my personal goal to obtain a Master of Arts in History.
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ABSTRACT

Historians have long overlooked Camp Cooke as a part of Montana history. As
the first military post in the territory, built in 1866, the presence of the 13th Infantry
answered the call of citizens in the new territory who demanded the U.S. Government
send armed protection Yet, after Camp Cooke was established, local residents and the
press attacked that same military that had met their demands for a post in the territory.
Sharp criticism berated the government for building Camp Cooke in a place even citizens
within Montana called the “Badlands.”
Life at this little known and mostly forgotten Army post on the Missouri River
differed from other military forts in the west. In this thesis, the conclusion will be made
that the placement of Camp Cooke by the United States Army was ill advised and the
soldiers at the post suffered from its location to an extent more than soldiers at most other
military posts in the west. The isolation of Camp Cooke, the inability of soldiers to
leave, even when their enlistments were up, and the constant fear of Indian raids all
played a part in the difficulty of life at this post. Given these measures, Camp Cooke
might be considered a failure.
In a larger sense, as the first military post in the territory, it did help to establish
safe mail and stage routes, and participated in building the more permanent posts of Fort
Shaw in the Sun River area and Fort Ellis in the Gallatin River Valley, near present day
Bozeman. It did provide safety to steamboats traveling on the Missouri River, gave
vi

stability to commerce in the territory, and began efforts of dealing with Indian tribes.
Largely forgotten since its closing in 1866, Camp Cooke remains a subject worthy of
study, as will be demonstrated.
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INTRODUCTION:
A TERRITORY DEMANDS PROTECTION
The decision to bring the United States Army into the Montana Territory was
proceeded by many years and many events, some occurring before the formation of the
territory itself. This growth of a pioneer culture demanding certain protections would
lead the military into an ill-conceived plan that would render the first post in Montana
almost powerless. The Army placed it in a location that would be of little benefit to the
people of the territory and the post would ultimately prove to have little in common with
most other military posts throughout the west.
The story of Montana begins in 1852 with Francois Finlay, a Canadian Métis, and
his return to the northwest after spending four years in California searching for gold.
Finlay, a tall, broad-shouldered man, dark skinned with long black hair, also carried the
name “Benetsse,” which local Indians gave him. Upon his return, Finlay resumed
working for the Hudson Bay Company. As one of their top trappers and guides in the
Bitterroots, the HBC welcomed him back. He was an imposing figure at just over six feet
tall. When not acting as a guide, he wandered the mountains of the Northern Rockies,
preferring the isolation and his own company. He briefly returned to his wife and
children during the harshest parts of the winter, but always left again with the first signs
of spring.1

1
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In 1852, as he traveled through the Clark’s Fork River valley area, south of
present-day Missoula, Montana, Finlay rode across a small creek. He glanced down,
making out some flakes shining in the sunlight through the ripples of the water. Finlay
began to pan the gravel in the stream and recovered about two ounces of gold.
As a “mountain man,” he knew what the discovery of gold would do to the
country he deeply respected and where he hunted and trapped furs. He wanted to keep
the knowledge of his find hidden. At nearby Fort Connah, the southern-most post of the
Hudson Bay Company, he purchased a few supplies using some of the gold, but
persuaded the trader with whom he did business to keep the discovery a secret. Word
still got out. Within three years, the area known as Benetsse’s Creek boasted a settlement
of miners who renamed it Gold Creek. By 1858, when Granville Stuart recorded arriving
at Gold Creek, forty-five miners were panning and digging for the yellow placer gold.2
Granville Stuart is known in Montana history books as “Mister Montana.” Born
in western Virginia in 1834, his family moved to Iowa in 1838 and he and his brother
attended school in Muscatine County. In 1849, his father followed the other gold seekers
to California. Two years later, Granville and his brothers, James and Robert, followed.
By 1857, they had decided to return to Iowa, but the violence of the Mormon Wars in
Utah blocked the road, so they changed direction and headed to Montana. Even though
members of the original discoverers of gold at Gold Creek, the Stuart brothers never did
reap large profits from the find. In the next fifty years, Stuart ran several different
mercantile businesses, became a co-owner in one of the largest cattle ranches in Montana
2
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history, the Montana State Cattle Commissioner, and in the 1890s accepted an
appointment as U. S. Ambassador to Uruguay and Paraguay. He died in 1918 while in
the process of writing a book on the history of Montana and his experiences in its
founding. The book was later finished and published in 1925.

Figure 1. Granville Stuart (Courtesy Montana History Society
Helena, Montana)
In 1862, Coloradans John White and William Eades came north, looking to
confirm the rumors of gold. They staked a claim in a valley fifty-five miles northwest of
the current boundary of Yellowstone National Park, and found huge deposits in a small
river. They named it “Grasshopper Creek.” According to their report, “grasshoppers in
the air were as plentiful as gold flakes in the water.” 3 The miners of Grasshopper Creek
later learned that Lewis and Clark had named the creek Worthington, after one of the
members of their expedition in 1805. The miners, however, refused to change the name.
A resident in the camp was named Worthington. He was not well liked and the
consensus was they were not going to let him later brag that the creek had been named
after him. Within a year, 400 individuals lived in this mining camp. The inhabitants
renamed the growing town “Bannack” – a misspelling of the Indian name “Bannock.”
3
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The U. S. Post Office published the town’s name in the 1863 “Guide to Town Names,”
the official list of post offices. During that year, Congress transferred the area from being
a part of the Nebraska Territory to becoming the eastern-most portion of the newly
created Idaho Territory.

Figure 2. Grasshopper Creek, as it looks today from the edge of
the town of Bannack, Montana (photo by author)
Within another twelve months, three thousand people called Bannack home.
Other mining camps at Last Chance Gulch, Diamond City, Brandon, Argenta, Reynolds
City, and Virginia City all grew quickly in population. By 1864, these mining camps and
the many towns that sprang up across the area boasted a population of nearly twenty
thousand. Calls arose for local governmental control. Citizens complained the Idaho
territorial government was too far away to be responsive to their needs. President
Lincoln granted their wish on May 28, 1864, when he signed the “Organic Act of the
Territory of Montana.”
Mining activity, as well as ranches and farms, started by those who had decided to
make their gold by selling fruits, vegetables, and beef at inflated boomtown prices, began

5

severely disrupting the lives of the native inhabitants. Indians had lived, hunted, and
migrated through this region for millennia. Threatened with continued loss of hunting
grounds and the often violent actions of the new arrivals, these “Americans” whom the
Blackfeet, Gros Ventre, Piegan, and Crow rightly considered invaders, the Indians
responded with attacks that became ever more frequent.
Editors of Virginia City’s The Montana Post filled issues with articles about
Indian attacks and “atrocities” that made travel to and from Montana hazardous. The
May 28, 1865, issue of The Montana Post reprinted a letter posted from the small mining
town of Ophir on May 26, two days earlier.
Dear Sir: on my arrive here to-day, to my horror and amazement I learned
the melancholy fact that H.W. Burris, Frank Angevine, Abraham Lott John
Allen, John Andrews, Henry Martin, James H. Lyon, and a “colored man”
named James Prince were massacred by the Indians yesterday morning on the
Marias, about three miles from here. The people here had just buried them
when I arrived here…It would be well for persons traveling here to keep a
good sharp lookout for Indians…go well armed and not in small parties.4

Figure 3. Bannack, Montana in the 1860s (photo from book A Governor’s
Wife on the Mining Frontier: The Letters of Mary Edgerton from
Montana, 1863-65)
In 1866, the territorial capital moved from Bannack, which had lost population, to
Virginia City, at that time the largest city in Montana. As the first paper in the territory,
4
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The Montana Post championed a campaign to bring the Army and soldiers into the
region. While insisting the federal government protect its citizens, the paper also called
on the territorial government to raise an interim force to protect Montanans.
The following communication came direct to Mr. W.F. Barlit, from Captain
Wall. The murder of a party of ten men is confirmed.
You have probably heard of the slaughter of ten men by the Indians. This is
correct. The Indians are desperate and daring, and there is but little safety
here. They are stealing horses and mean war…The pagans (Piegans) and
Blackfeet can be trusted or not. The Governor should raise three hundred and
fifty or five hundred mounted men and send them immediately.5
Acting Territorial Governor Thomas Francis Meagher felt the pressure. Talk in
saloons and parlors included the latest news about “butchery and depredations”
committed by the “red savages.” Whether he was walking along Virginia City’s boarded
sidewalks or riding in its dusty streets, on a horse or in a carriage, groups of citizens
constantly harangued Meagher with questions about what actions he planned to take to
protect them.
All of this led Meagher to announce plans for the formation of a “Montana
Militia.” Any talk of a militia, at this time, was nothing more than “talk.” Meagher had
neither the authority nor the funds to raise an army. In the territory, such actions would
require approval from the federal government. He did make demands that the U.S. Army
send trained and well-armed troops into the territory to punish the Indians for their
activities and protect the citizenry. Thomas Francis Meagher served only as the “Acting”
territorial governor. President Lincoln’s gubernatorial appointee, Sidney Edgerton, had

5
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traveled from the Montana Territory to Washington, D.C. in the late spring of 1865 to
plead with Congress to speed up the transfer of funds designated for paying territorial
bills.
Prior to Lincoln’s appointment of Edgerton as a Federal Judge in the Idaho
Territory, he had been a Congressional Representative from Ohio. Politicians knew him
as a radical anti-slavery and anti-Southern member of the new Republican Party. He had
traveled across country in an ox-drawn wagon with his wife, and settled in Bannack. He
was prepared to serve on the bench in Bannack, but made no rulings since there was no
official to swear him in and no legal authority for him to take the oath. Edgerton had
been appointed as an Idaho judge and the territory was still operating under Washington
Territorial laws. An Idaho legislature had yet to meet and establish laws for the newly
designated territory. He needed to travel to Boise City to be sworn in after the legislature
had met. This involved an additional travel of 800 miles and an unknown period of time
as the Idaho legislature went about establishing its own laws. Should he not make the
trip, Edgerton believed any decisions he might make could be summarily overturned
since he could not be legally recognized as an Idaho Territorial Judge under the currently
enforced Washington laws. With these questions unresolved, and seeing an opportunity
for making a new political career for himself, Edgerton observed the unrest among the
people of the mining camps and became a leader in the movement for recognition of a
separate territory. Known for his fiery rhetoric and single-minded determination, he
championed the independence of “Montana” from the rest of the Idaho territory and used
the press as a trumpet for his views.

8

Following Lincoln’s signing of the Organic Act that created the territory of
Montana, Edgerton accepted the President’s appointment as its first governor. He soon
found Montana to be very far from the minds of the government and the fortunes of the
territory seemed inconsequential in Congress. His efforts in establishing a territorial
government were accruing bills Montana had no money to pay. In April 1865, Edgerton
left Secretary Meagher in temporary control and traveled to Washington, D.C., intent on
reminding Congress of its responsibilities to assist the new territory in its financial
obligations. Edgerton became disgusted after spending two months in Washington trying
to secure the funds promised to the Montana Territory. Furthermore, he was chastised by
some members of Congress for leaving his position in Montana to travel to Washington
without first obtaining permission from the Secretary of State. In anger and frustration,
he returned home to Ohio. In Akron, he resumed his law practice, which he continued
until his death in 1900. He never returned to Montana.

Figure 4. Sidney Edgerton (photo from book A Governor’s
Wife on the Mining Frontier: The Letters of Mary Edgerton from
Montana, 1863-65)
Acting Territorial Governor Thomas Francis Meagher brought a colorful history
to the position he assumed on Edgerton’s departure. Meagher, born in Ireland in 1823,

9

had become a vocal proponent of the movement calling for the expulsion of Britain from
Ireland and a Free Irish Republic. English Courts sentenced him to death for “seditious
libel” in protesting English rule over Ireland. Under pressure, the British government
later commuted Meagher’s sentence, and exiled him to Tasmania. He escaped and fled to
America.
Meagher arrived in New York, became a U.S. citizen. Following the start of the
Civil War and with the encouragement of Colonel Robert Nugent of the 69th New York
Regiment, Meagher joined the New York Militia. He accepted the rank of
Captain and was later placed in command of Company K, of the Irish Zouves, a part of
the 69th New York Regiment. After Bull Run, Meagher returned to New York, where
under instructions from General Irwin McDowell, commanding the Army of
Northeastern Virginia, Meagher enlisted troops to form an Irish Brigade. Meagher later
attained the rank of Brigadier General before his departure from the military.

Figure 5. Brigadier General Thomas Francis Meagher – photo taken by A.C.
Carter in Virginia City, Montana Territory 1866 or 67 (courtesy
Montana Historical Library, Helena, Montana)
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Meagher returned to New York after the war, uncertain what direction to go with
his life. President Andrew Johnson, a fellow Democrat, offered him an appointment as
secretary to Governor Edgerton for the Montana Territory. This would make him the
second most powerful political figure in the territory, and offer a possible step up to
future political opportunities. He quickly accepted the position. When Edgerton did not
return to Montana, Meagher became the de facto governor of the territory.
Politically, Meagher sided with the Republican-controlled Congress, and
informed the Secretary of State, William Seward, that the ex-Confederate Democrats in
the territory were not trustworthy. Though a Democrat himself, Meagher had aligned
himself strongly with the Republicans to gain his position as Secretary of the Montana
Territory and acting Governor in Edgerton’s absence. Within a short time, however, he
changed sides and proclaimed that the Confederate Democrats were honorable men and
they would help guide Montana’s future. It appeared the local Radical Republicans had
anticipated that Meagher would be a pliable tool for their use. However, he refused to
bow to them and thus began a long and bitter rivalry for power in the territory. Meagher
fought to retain control over the legislature, nullifying some of its laws, vetoing others,
and calling the lawmakers back to special session at will.
Rumors, believed to have been started by “high placed officials,” began to spread.
Stories, planted in the ears of newspaper writers, told of Meagher’s drunken exploits and
alleged visits to the less reputable parts of Virginia City and questioned Meagher’s sanity
and fitness for his office. One article noted that at a time when a bottle of bourbon could
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be purchased for three dollars, the Acting Governor ran up a tab in one pub of $274.6
Despite the accusations and “scuttlebutt,” Thomas Francis Meagher took his temporary
position of Governor seriously. He contacted Major General Frank Wheaton at Fort
Laramie, Wyoming, requesting him to send soldiers to Montana to deal with the
“growing, dangerous, and out of control” Indian problem. In a letter, later published in
The Montana Post, Meagher relayed information sent to him from General Wheaton.
The General forwarded Meagher’s letter to Brigadier General R.E. Conner, attached to
the Division of the Missouri headquarters in Omaha. Meagher reported that the military
refused to send help to Montana “at this time.”
It was the middle of December, and Gen. Connor, writing to me on the subject
expresses his great regret that he was compelled to pronounce it unadvisable
to march troops into our Territory, at this time, the weather being to[o] broken
and inclement. He assures me, however, that we will have them with the
opening of Spring.7
In his role as Acting Governor, Meagher also wrote to General William T.
Sherman, the commander of the Military Division of Missouri, with predictions of the
“plundering, burning and wanton slaughter” that would happen should he refuse to send
soldiers to the territory. The citizens of Virginia City were not alone in haranguing
Meagher to secure military protection for the Montana territory. Just months before he
was himself killed in an attack by Blackfeet Indians in April 1867, famed explorer John
Bozeman wrote to Meagher pleading for protection along the immigrant wagon trail he
had blazed. In his book, The Calamity Papers, Dale Walker wrote:

6
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To his old chief, Gen. W.T. Sherman, now commanding the Army’s
Department of the Missouri, Meagher requested a military force of a thousand
men and a permanent garrison for the territory to protect its settlers, miners
and citizens against Indian raids. Sherman was unmoved and called the acting
governor a “stampeder.” 8
Sherman did not accede to Meagher’s requests, but did authorize the acting
governor to raise a local militia and promised him the United States government would
pay forty-five cents per day for a force of up to 400 men. As Commander of the Division
of the Missouri, Sherman stipulated that these men must supply their own weapons and
equipment. Although not all he hoped for, Meagher finally had received authority for the
formation of his Montana Militia.
There is no indication that Sherman informed Meagher he had already sent a
party, led by Colonel D.B. Sackett, on a scouting expedition up the Missouri River to
investigate sites for the building of a military post in the Montana territory. During the
spring and summer of 1865, Col. Sackett’s patrol traveled as far up the Missouri as Fort
Benton, searching for suitable locations for an initial military post. Sackett’s report
recommended the establishment of a post above the mouth of the Musselshell River, near
Cow Island, or near the mouth of the Judith River. He was extremely critical of building
a post near Fort Benton. In the years since Alexander Culbertson had established a post
of the “Pierre Chouteau, Junior’s Western Department” as a fur-trading post there in
1847, Benton City had grown into a bustling business community and was the major
point on the river for steamboats to load and unload cargoes. Sackett indicated his belief
that a shortage of wood in the area would make constructing and maintaining a military
8
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installation difficult. In an appendix to his report, Sackett recommended that a post be
built as soon as practicable near the Sun River and close to St. Peter’s Mission. From this
latter location, soldiers could observe and monitor the activities of the Blackfeet Indians
on their reservation.
During this time, The Montana Post continued to report Indian attacks, thus
further enraging and alarming local citizens. The headlines in the February 10, 1866
edition read:
Onslaught on Cow Island by the Indians:
Great Excitement in the Bad Lands…Indians Attack Cow Island and are
Repulsed…Snake Point, one Mile Above, Taken by Storm…Proclamation by
Governor Johnson* calling for Four Thousand Volunteers…Assiniboine
Squaws on the Rampage…Huge Droves of Buffalo on the Warpath…The
Beavers Remain Quiet.9
In April of the same year, an article published in The Montana Radiator confirmed the
coming of the military:
It is now positively asserted that General Grant will send an expedition, in
May next, to explore the routes between the Minnesota border and Montana
with the view of establishing a continuous chain of military posts with a view
for the protection of emigrants.10
The Des Moines Iowa Register published an article in April that included excerpts
from a letter addressed to Nebraska Secretary of State James Wright. Sent by General
William T. Sherman, the letter outlined plans for military changes in command structure
that would directly affect Montana. In the letter, Sherman gave notice of directions to
separate a part of the west, including Montana, into a new department – The Department
9
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10
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of the Platte – with headquarters in Omaha. He also outlined the movement of troops
with instructions to guard the immigrant trails heading west:
We propose to guard as well as possible the Missouri river route. This makes
three routes into Montana convenient for your Iowa emigrants and this is all
we can or should attempt. Indeed, if emigrants will disregard our published
plans by choosing intermediate routes, they not only shall have no protection,
but if we find it likely to produce Indian hostility and collisions, we may
interfere.11
Indications are that by the time the Iowa Register published the letter, the
Department of the Platte was already in operation. Sherman appointed Brigadier General
Philip St. George Cooke as commander. On April 14, 1866, the same day the Des
Moines Newspaper article appeared, Gen. Cooke issued General Orders No. 3, directing
officers and soldiers of the Thirteenth Infantry to travel from Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, to
Fort Sully in the Dakota Territory. Eight companies of the regiment were instructed to
march north of the Black Hills with orders to build a fort on the Cheyenne River. Upon
completion, Gen. Cooke decreed that four companies would remain and staff the post
while the remaining four would return to winter at Fort Randall, also located in the
Dakota Territory.
On May 20, 1866, Gen. Cooke changed the orders. He rescinded them with
General Orders No. 6. In these orders, he directed the Thirteenth Infantry to abandon
plans for a post north of the Black Hills and instructed the Battalion, under the command
of Major William Clinton, to proceed to Montana. Colonel I.V.N. Reeve led the
expedition. Gen. Cooke gave Col. Reeve the assignment of picking a site for a post
within the Montana territory and then returning to Fort Rice, Dakota Territory, where he
11
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would establish headquarters for the District of Montana. Also contained within these
orders were instructions for the transportation of men and for the horses they would need.
…The 1st Batt will proceed to Fort Benton & there in that vicinity establish a
post…Col. Reeve, Comdr of the Dist will superintend these movements in
person & after the location of the new post, will return and establish the Dist
Hdqrs at Fort Rice.
The ponies ordered for the Black Hills Fort will be taken to Fort Benton. If
found practicable, Major Clinton will send them by land by the selected
soldiers fully armed and equipped.12
In early July, eight companies of the Thirteenth Infantry boarded three riverboats.
Leaving from Fort Sully, the steamboats – the Lacy, Montana, and Mary McDonald –
began their trip up the Missouri River into the Montana Territory.
The ill-fated experiment that would become known as Camp Cooke was about to
begin. It would prove to be an unwise choice of locations. It would be a post the army
did not keep properly staffed and properly equipped, and in the end, it would disappear
without a trace or a place in the memory of but a few.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE 13TH INFANTRY ARRIVES IN MONTANA
On July 10, 1866, The United States Army began its presence in Montana with
the first military post in the territory located on the east bank of the Missouri River where
the Judith and the Missouri join. “Special Orders No. 55” listed the names of the officers
staffing the post, its location, and the post’s name. Col. I.V.N. Reeve, in charge of the
new District of Montana, made the orders brief.
On Board Steamer “Mary McDonald” July 10. 1866
Special Orders 55
In compliance with General Orders No 6 of May 20, Head Quarters
Department of the Platte, at Omaha N.T. Major Wm. Clinton, 13th U.S.
Infantry in Command of the 1st Battalion of that regiment, will establish a Post
at the mouth of the Judith River, Montana Territory. The Camp until further
orders will be called Camp Cooke.
Detail for the Command: Major Wm Clinton, Captain Saml. A. Wainwright,
Captain Charles A. Webb, Captain Ferd. E. DeCourcy, 1st Lieut. F.T.
McGinnis, lst Lieut James D. Graham13
It was a desolate spot, far from any center of population. The riverboats had
passed a small town at the Musselshell eighty-five miles downstream. Fort Benton was
just over one hundred miles upstream. As the soldiers gazed upon this land in the
wilderness on which they were to build their post, land the locals called the “Badlands,”
the question must surely have been asked, “Why here?”
Elsewhere, as directed by General Orders #6 (a portion of which is quoted in the
introduction), a patrol of officers and soldiers were bringing horses overland. In a letter
13
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he posted from Camp Cooke on July 21, 1866, Lieutenant Martin F. Hogan related his
experiences on this cross-country trip to Andrew O. Connell, a brother-in-law to his
brother.
I arrived with my cavalry at this post just 4 days ago from Fort Copeland [a
fur trading post in Eastern Montana Territory]. Had a splendid time. I was in
no hurry and took it leisurely, marching only 15 or 20 miles per day. My
route was up the Milk River, camping along above the Bear Paw Mountains.14
The journey of Lieutenant Martin Hogan’s patrol down the Milk River would
have been a pleasant one in July, as they skirted the Bear’s Paw Mountains and made
their way along the rolling hills where few difficult peaks would impede their progress.
The majority of the trip passed through grass-covered foothills. A mixture of ash trees
and lodge pole pines could give shade from a relentless summer sun

Figure 6. Bear’s Paw Mountains, Northern Montana (photo from Montana
Travel Brochure)
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Lewis and Clark named the stream Milk River on their westward trip on May 8, 1805.
In their journals, Lewis wrote, “the water of this river possesses a peculiar whiteness, being
about the colour of a cup of tea with the admixture of a tablespoonfull of milk. from the
colour of its water we called it Milk river.”15 The river meanders through a broad valley.
Flowing smoothly with many low banks and edges along its course, it provided easy access
to the horses of Hogan’s party. The soldiers slept comfortably in the cool mountain nights.
The tent encampments next to the river, however, were muggy and made most unpleasant by
the constant drone and determination of the thick hoards of flies, gnats, and mosquitoes that
overran the Northern Montana countryside. After leaving the Milk River drainage, Hogan’s
patrol traveled east across the sagebrush and cactus covered Badlands until they arrived at the
Missouri River. Upon reaching the western bank of the river, he and his cavalry detachment
swam and forded their horses across the Missouri. Herding the Army livestock the last few
hundred yards along the eastern bank, Hogan’s patrol arrived at Camp Cooke.

Figure 7. Milk River flowing into the Missouri River (photo by permission
of Jim Werk, Airphoto – 2006)
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Lt. Hogan wrote in the July letter to Andrew O’Donnell of the construction the
Army had already begun in building the camp. He penned, “The Battalion will have
much work preparing winter quarters at this point during the summer and fall.”16
Hogan’s letter made it obvious that the soldiers of the Thirteenth Infantry would be
constructing their own post. This backbreaking work – often performed by hired
civilians at a good rate of pay in other camps – would prevent the soldiers from carrying
out their typical training and duties, though orders issued appear to show that Major
Clinton expected a normal run of soldierly duties to continue during construction.
On another note, however, Lt. Hogan’s letter brings up a question concerning how
long the Army did plan to use Camp Cooke. His comment about “winter quarters” made
Cooke’s existence sound temporary. A report written in 1868 by Post Surgeon A.B.
Campbell repeated previous remarks that the Army intended Camp Cooke to be a
transitory post.
It was originally established as a camp with instructions for the troops to hut
themselves for the winter; consequently the building are very poorly
constructed as especially as the result to the short time remaining for that
purpose. They were commenced in August 1866 and occupied in November
1866.17
An August 25, 1866, letter by Lt. Martin Hogan again supported a belief that the government
saw Camp Cooke as only a winter encampment.
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I am under the impression that I with my Cavalry Command will winter at
Sun River and the Battalion will undoubtedly move there and build a
permanent quarters next Spring.18
The Army filled those first days with long hours of backbreaking work under a
merciless, hot summer sun. July days in the “Badlands” could often reach temperatures
greater than 100 degrees Fahrenheit. Some nights rarely cooled below the mid -70s.
Mosquitoes were fierce and unforgiving. Soldiers unloaded the riverboats and stacked
supplies on the banks. They covered them with tarpaulins and branches. Major Clinton
immediately ordered several sentries to guard the supplies.

Figure 8. A view of the “Badlands” (photo by author – 1981)
While soldiers unloaded the riverboats, other infantrymen proceeded to the task of
setting up temporary shelters consisting of small tents for themselves and larger tents for
the officers. Among the supplies was equipment for a blacksmith shop and a sawmill.

18
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In some locations, the Army hired civilian labor as construction crews for building
the posts. On the Northern Plains, the Army used the Twenty-Second Infantry as a de facto
construction company. In the course of six years, they had a hand in the construction or
rebuilding of ten military posts or Indian agencies. Some of these included Fort Sully, Fort
Randall, Fort Rice, and Fort Berthold. After orders that sent the unit up the Yellowstone
River for assignment to build another post, one officer of the 22nd Infantry wrote home that
he felt they had been isolated long enough and deserved reassignment back to the states and
civilization where they could “enjoy the service of Uncle Sam.”19 This was not the situation
at Camp Cooke. Clinton dispatched crews of soldiers from his own 13th Infantry to build
these structures.
The Army found the land around Camp Cooke rich in timber, though most of it
did consist of cottonwood trees. Smaller quantities of ash, alder, and birch grew along
the banks of the Judith River, and cedar, spruce, and yellow pine grew on the bluffs and
hillsides above the camp. Soldiers felled the trees that other soldiers in the sawmill cut
into usable boards.
The blacksmith forged nails and hinges, which the Army did not carry due to their
excessive weight or the inability of the steamships to carry the necessary quantities, from
barrel hoops and spare iron. Major Clinton reported that the first buildings to be finished
were storerooms.
Adobe made from mud and sand in the Missouri River and used for caulking
between the boards and bricks baked in the sun, giving support to walls and doorways.
19

Field, Ron. Forts of the American Frontier 1820-91: Central and Northern Plains,
(Westminster, MD, Osprey Publishing, 2005) Pg 33

22

Sod, cut from the grassy plains near the camp, was used as a final covering over the roofs
of the buildings.
The Army believed the choice of the Judith as the site for building Camp Cooke
had sound military reasoning. Colonel Sackett’s report seemed to indicate this location
would have an effect on controlling Indian attacks on riverboats. He had reported the
previous summer on the site sitting between two rapids. One set of rapids was three
miles downstream and the other was twelve miles upstream. The water level at Cow
Island, located nearly 260 river miles downstream from Fort Benton, determined when
river traffic started in the spring and ended in the late summer or early fall. Riverboats
required at least three feet of draft. Extremely low water levels could force crews to
offload their cargos and transport them around the rapids to another boat. Indians often
used this time of offloading cargo between the rapids to attack. Merchants whose cargos
filled the boats viewed a post with soldiers prepared to counter such attacks as a
necessary and welcome deterrent. Citizens, newspapers, and the territorial government,
however, would soon begin to voice their displeasure with the location and the command
of the post.
Questioning the Army’s placement of Camp Cooke’s location started almost
immediately. Montana newspapers began to criticize the location of Camp Cooke as
early as August 1866. The Virginia City Montana Post printed in an article:
The magnificent force will be rendered useless and totally unemployed,
except in the scientific starvation of horses of the command by a winter’s
course of ‘cottonwood bark and willow tops’ now being gathered for forage.
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In the spring, they will look as if fed on flour barrels, their ribs will stand out
like staves.20
Post Returns in July 1866 show that the Department of the Platte sent eight
companies to Camp Cooke. The “returns” were the monthly record of soldiers and
officers assigned to a military unit. They included orders and events occurring during the
month. Each company reported between seventy-six and eighty-three men. Camp
Cooke’s Post Returns for the end of July listed a total of 678 officers and enlisted men.21
The numbers would have provided Camp Cooke with a fully complemented staff with
numbers actually larger than some other western posts. With the exception of sentries
who guarded the quartermaster stores, herders who watched the stock, and sentries pacing
the perimeter of the camp, all available hands took part in the erection of the buildings.
In his July 21, 1866, letter, Lt. Hogan invited Andrew O’Connell to the post for a visit,
but told him he would probably not have much time for socializing. He wrote, “…will
have to[o] much work…to spare one if its officers.”22 Lt. Hogan’s letter offers
information about Camp Cooke in its first month. He wrote O’Connell of a visit to Camp
Cooke by Acting Governor Thomas Francis Meagher. Hogan wrote that Governor
Meagher spent three days at the camp in late July. He said the Governor visited him, “in
my quarters for a few hours,” indicating that work details had erected tents for officers
and soldiers by that time.
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In what would become a regular occurrence at Camp Cooke, Courts Martial
began almost immediately. Trials of soldiers covered a wide field from desertion to theft
to drunkenness on duty. The court martial of Sgt. W.F. Reid showed how, even with the
hardships of a frontier outpost, military protocol and the notion that “rank has its
privileges” could raise its head. Sgt. W.F. Reid was a married man with wife and infant
child. Due to a shortage of suitable tents, he accepted a larger shelter, referred to as a
“Wall” tent. A few days later, Lieutenant James Graham, a single, nineteen-year-old
officer, notified Reid, through First Sergeant Gottlieb Esali, that he expected the Sgt. to
vacate the tent and have it moved to a more suitable location so he could occupy it. Sgt.
Reid refused to leave until another shelter was provided for his family. A detail of four
soldiers later showed up in order to dismantle the tent. Again, Reid refused to leave until
his family was given proper shelter. Corporal Patrick McKenna informed the Sgt. of the
dangerous situation in which he was placing himself. Reid told him he would leave the
tent when he was provided with a satisfactory place to shelter his wife and infant child.
Major Clinton called Sgt. Reid before him. He told him, Reid later testified, that
he faced charges. His original intent to charge Sgt. Reid with “Disobedience of Military
Orders” would be amended to read “Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military
Discipline.” This revision of charges allowed him to hold a Court Martial with a board of
officers at Camp Cooke. The alternative would have been to transport him to Fort Rice
where the commanding officer of that post would have been required to appoint a board
of field-grade officers for conducting the court martial.
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In his trial, held on August 8, Sgt. Reid testified he could not, in good conscience,
surrender the tent without first obtaining adequate shelter for his wife and child. He also
believed that since his wife was a laundress, and regulations entitled her to a tent, they
should have another shelter before Lieutenant Graham evicted them from their current
structure. All these actions had taken place on July 24, just fourteen days after the
soldiers of the 13th Infantry arrived at the site of Camp Cooke. Though Lt. Graham was a
member of the Courts Martial board, and the recipient of the Sgt’s tent, and was thus
involved in the case, he did not remove himself and participated in the trial and the
decision. The board found Sgt. Reid guilty on all counts and sentenced him to a
a reduction in rank to Private, though he was spared the indignity of extra duties and hard
labor.23
Despite the activities of the trials, the necessary attention to guarding and securing
the property of the post, and protecting the livestock, the outline of the post gradually
began to take shape. As August proceeded, the hot days continued. The sawmill worked
long hours, producing planks for finishing the buildings. A detail of soldiers daily carried
water up from the Missouri River and poured it into barrels scattered about the camp.
These were located near the sites of the barracks, the kitchen, hospital, and the stables.
An attempt to dig wells had proven fruitless. The ground contained too much alkali to
allow the water to be potable. Latrines were dug at a respectable distance from the walls
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– custom called for a separate facility for the women at the post. It would take the
soldiers of Camp Cooke until November to finish the buildings.
Officers and soldiers at Camp Cooke had disembarked from riverboats onto the
banks of the Missouri River provided with all the equipment the Army believed they
needed to establish the first post in this new territory of Montana. Major Clinton, as
commander, set about the task of preparing winter quarters for the nearly seven hundred
men of the Thirteenth Infantry. Though the summer days were hot, they had heard what
the winter could bring and William Clinton intended to see they were inside adequate
quarters as soon as his men could be willed, urged, cajoled, and ordered to complete
them.
The soldiers at Camp Cooke would soon learn the isolation and difficulties they faced
with being the first post in the territory and the disrespect local newspapers and citizens
began to heap upon them.
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CHAPTER TWO:
A POST IS BUILT – CAMP COOKE BEGINS
As August ended, soldiers continued their strenuous and backbreaking work on
the construction of the post. While there could be little doubt it was a demanding and
difficult endeavor, in the midst of the heat and excruciating labor with the soldiers
struggling to build their post, Major Clinton inexplicably ordered the men put on short
rations. A later report contained testimony showing the men were, by orders of Major
Clinton, to receive no more than twelve ounces of bread as a portion of their daily rations.
Regulations called for each soldier to receive sixteen ounces of bread per day. Despite a
later Report of Survey investigating a huge quantity of stolen food items, Clinton
maintained that if he chose to put the soldiers on short rations, they were entitled to only
as much food as he felt they deserved. Though he sent back the investigation for theft of
food items three times, he ultimately had to accept the findings of the Board of Survey
that no single individual could be found guilty and hungry soldiers would steal when the
opportunity presented itself. Major Clinton on several occasions instituted stringent
measures that made life at Camp Cooke excessively difficult and further added to lower
morale of soldiers at the post.
Special Orders 6, issued by Clinton on August 30, 1866, on the surface should
have made life easier for those living at Camp Cooke. A part of this order directed
Captains Wainwright, Webb, and DeCourcy to nominate a Post Sutler.
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The Post Sutler was typically a civilian the army hired to run a store on a military
installation. Army regulations in 1865 had ended the position of Post Sutler, but
unofficially left the decision to have a civilian operating the camp store up to
commanders in the more isolated frontier posts. Soldiers and local civilians could
purchase most non-military needs and many military ones at the Sutler’s store.
Customers found items as widely varied as tobacco, rifles, soap, and fresh vegetables (in
season). On those posts that did allow the sale of alcohol, the Sutler was also in charge of
its sale and dispensing. Often, local businessmen contracted to run the store. Camp
Cooke contracted with Nathaniel Pope Trading Company at Fort Benton to run the
business. While the concept of a civilian contractor for the Sutler’s store could have
advantages in the merchandise that might be sold, there is little doubt the prices the store
would charge would be extremely high due to the miles the goods were transported and
the salary Pope would be paying a “storekeeper.”
In a second part of Special Orders 6, Maj. Clinton selected Lt. Keeling, Lt. Hogan,
and a non-commissioned officer for a mission to search for forage. The two officers and
sergeant departed the next day, scouting for sufficient quantities of hay to winter the post’s
livestock. The hunt for feed to supply the mules, horses, and cattle would become an endless
issue. Maj. Clinton wrote to Col. Reeve claiming to have adequate amounts of hay and grass.
Hd Quars Post
Camp Cooke MT Sept 5th 1866
AA Adjt Genl
Dist of Upper Mo.
Fort Rice D. T.
Sir
There is a sufficiency of wood at this Post and grazing is sufficient at present,
for what animals we have. I am cutting what hay I can find in the vicinity of the
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Post. Capt Wainwright with his Comp will start to day for Eagle Creek about
20 miles distance, where I think we can get about 40 Ton of good hay, this with
what young Cottonwoods we can find, will, I hope will get us through the
winter.24
On the average, it would take one ton of hay per animal to make it through a
normal winter. Winters in the Badlands were rarely what these soldiers would have
previously experienced as “normal.” Temperatures could plummet to -30° Fahrenheit or
more and stay there for days. Central Montana also experiences an anomaly in weather
that locals have long called a “Chinook.” This is characterized by unexpected warm
southwesterly winds that can raise the temperature from subzero to sixty or seventy
degrees above in a matter of hours, before colder temperatures return. This could result
in freezing, thawing, flooding, and freezing again all within a twenty-four hour period.
The rapid rise in temperature, followed by an equally sudden decline could lead to
marshy ground in which the animal’s feet could freeze. It could also lead to sudden
floods followed by large sheets of ice covering wide expanses of ground.
The Army had assigned Camp Cooke the mission of spreading a military presence
to Montana. While the construction of the post continued, Major Clinton decided the
duties for which the soldiers of the Thirteenth Infantry were sent west could not be
postponed. This action began within a matter of weeks of their arrival. Hogan wrote to
O’Connell on August 25 that “I am commanding the Cavalry of the Command and will
be in Fort Benton and Sun River some time between the 1st and 15th of September.”
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By September 12, 1866, Capt. Wainwright and Lt. Hogan had been ordered to the
Sun River area where they would establish and guard a mail route from Fort Benton to
Helena. Hogan obviously was not going to miss Camp Cooke. In a September 7 letter he
wrote to Andrew O’Connell his feelings regarding the Judith River post and his
perception of the Camp Cooke site held by the soldiers he was about to leave behind.
…in a few days

we will have the pleasure of bidding a last, but by no means
tearful farewell to the bleak hills of the Judith. We should have gone there
(Sun River) at first to be of any benefit to the people of the Territory, as we
are no more use here than in St. Louis. It was no will of ours in stopping here
we only obeyed orders from a higher source…25

This appears to be the first actual statement by a soldier displaying a notable
dislike for Camp Cooke. Lieutenant Hogan seemed to hold back nothing in telling
O’Connell his distinct pleasure in leaving Camp Cooke for a new posting miles away.
Nothing in his letter indicated what his exact reasoning was, but it would not be expected
for a soldier to put it in writing, particularly if it involved the command structure of his
post – to which he was still under the authority. There seemed to be a general
disagreement about the appropriateness of the location Col. Sackett had suggested in
placing a post on the Missouri. In his book, Old Forts of the Northwest, Herbert M. Hart
commented that the location “…disenchanted the merchants of Fort Benton and Helena,
all of whom felt the Army payroll could be spent better closer to them.” 26 Those
merchants who ran the businesses in western towns knew that military posts bought
supplies and wanted the military payrolls soldiers brought. It was common knowledge
25
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that soldiers, given the opportunity, spent money freely. Soldiers trapped by the isolation
of Camp Cooke could neither spend money, nor bolster the local economies as soldiers
did in so many other western towns.
James L. Fisk, a prominent owner of Missouri riverboats, decried the
establishment of Camp Cooke on the Judith River in an article printed in the far-off St.
Paul (Minnesota) Weekly Press in October 1866:
As is evidence of the farce now being enacted upon this part of the world, or
on the upper Missouri, so far as military is concerned, I will suggest that a
force of 800 – partly mounted – were sent up this last summer to give
protect(ion) to and assist in developing the area of country embracing Fort
Benton, Great Falls of the Missouri, Sun River valley and the gold belts
adjacent. But instead of establishing this force where they could or can be
reached in case of trouble, or made in some degree the means of protection
and encouragement in settling and developing the country, they have been
stuck in a narrow cañon or isolated gulch making up from the Missouri some
forty-five or fifty miles below Fort Benton, and on the opposite side of the
river…In short, it confuses everybody here, and throughout the territory with
one accord to fathom or devise what earthy object there can be in the present
farcical disposition of paid military forces.27
Newspapers continued to express little confidence in the abilities of the Army. The
October 27, 1866, issue of The Montana Post offered an editorial attacking the efficiency
of the soldiers and registered its opinion that the Army could not even protect itself.
The Piegans have stolen more than 500 horses from our citizens and before
the reign of winter is ended, will have all that belong to the inefficient cavalry
of our government…Since the arrival of the regulars, the responsibility of the
people have been increased because they must protect the solders, who cannot
defend themselves.28
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Maj. Clinton reported that construction was completed in November 1866 – this
at a time when a typical Badlands winter would already have left several inches of snow
on the ground and subfreezing temperatures in the air.

Figure 9. Camp Cooke, 1868, from drawing by A.E. Mathews
(Courtesy Montana Historical Society, Helena, Montana)
The only illustration of Camp Cooke, according to the Montana Historical
Society, is a pencil sketch drawn and published in 1868. The drawing done by A.W.
Matthews appeared in a sketchbook he published of his travels in the west.
There are no walls around the post, making it resemble some of the other posts
built about this time in the Dakota and Wyoming Territories. Matthews added realism to
the picture in showing a company of soldiers marching across the parade ground and
laundry hanging from the lines.
One can only imagine the gladness the soldiers felt in abandoning their tents and
moving into barracks with solid walls and fireplaces that could provide some heat during
a Montana night. This time in November 1866 may have been one of the few times
during their stay at Camp Cooke that the soldiers were happy to be safe, warm, and as
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content as a soldier can be under the circumstances. Unfortunately, it was a feeling not
destined to last.

\
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CHAPTER THREE:
PATROLS ARE MOUNTED – THE PRESS ATTACKS
With Camp Cooke completed in November, and now in full operation, the
soldiers of the Thirteenth Infantry prepared to engage in the duties for which the War
Department had sent them to Montana. They learned this included dying on the frontier
and being buried far from home and family. On December 1, Lieutenants Wenekebach
and Reedy led a patrol to Eagle Creek to retrieve the bodies of four soldiers killed by an
Indian raiding party. The troopers had been part of a mail patrol on the way to Fort
Benton. Special Orders 46, signed by Major Clinton, instructed Wenekebach and Reedy
to watch for “any straggling bands of Indians…question any they may find, detain any
without a justifiable reason for being in the area, and bring them back to Camp Cooke for
questioning.”29
The Montana Post issue of December 29 reported on the attack. The article
included news of the killing of a Piegan “Chief” named Strangling Wolf. Also included
was a letter from Fort Benton’s Choteau County Sheriff, Bill S. Hamilton. It was dated
December 10, and Hamilton reported the Indian’s body “was conveyed back to Camp
Cooke, with the four soldiers, and buried.” Camp Cooke cemetery records show that a
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Piegan Chief named Pilauista was killed on November 30, 1866, and buried in the post
cemetery. The cemetery records do not indicate the names of the four interred soldiers,
who died on that same day, but they do list four graves as “unknown” – the markers bore
no names or dates.30 Complete cemetery records were not recorded until 1868.
Sheriff Hamilton made additional remarks in the paper that complemented the
soldiers at Camp Cooke, but then harshly criticized the Army for placing them at the
Judith River site. Hamilton wrote, “The soldiers are gentlemen of the first order and no
lovers of Indians and would sooner fight than eat. However, they might as well be in New
York as where they were…they are no account to the citizens where they are.”31
January 1867 brought a bitter cold winter to Camp Cooke. The Fahrenheit
thermometer often plummeted down to single digits and many nights reached negative
numbers. Transportation on the river usually came to a standstill in early fall due to the
lower water flow. By November or early December, all movement on the river ceased as
the Missouri froze over.
Even in the harsh winter, the Army’s mission of spreading the presence and
influence of soldiers across central Montana continued. To that end, Major Clinton
ordered Captain DeCourcy and a detail to Fort Benton with the assignment of
establishing a mail relay between Camp Cooke, Fort Benton, and Helena. DeCourcy
located quarters for the mail riders and a stable for the horses. The detachment traveled
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between Fort Benton and Camp Cooke twice a week, weather permitting. This would
have been a coveted assignment, being the post’s only real contact with the world outside
of the Judith River Basin, especially during the winter months.
With a frozen Missouri, the lack of river traffic caused a much more serious
problem than the lack of regular communications. No transportation on the water meant
there was no way for soldiers who had completed their enlistments to leave the post and
return to the states. It was often April before the waterway was free of ice and riverboats
again began to ply the upper Missouri.
Adding to this problem, paymasters infrequently visited Camp Cooke during its
four years. Records indicate that during that period of time, from July 1866 to March
1870 - forty-four months, soldiers at Camp Cooke were paid three times. A letter dated
June 1867 from Camp Cooke to Headquarters for the District of Montana at Fort Rice
stated that when the paymaster arrived at the post three months previously, it was the first
time the men of the Thirteenth Infantry had received pay in over a year.
To ease some of the burdens on these discharged and marooned soldiers, Camp
Cooke General Orders 3, dated February 5, 1867, instructed company commanders to
draw extra rations for men who had formerly been in their command. However, those
ex-soldiers waiting on pay and transportation would also be required to bear the cost of
those rations before final disposition and departure from the post. This led to much
grumbling and complaint. Privates of the Civil War era earned $13.00 to $15.00 per
month. The government allotted eleven cents per meal for rations. In a thirty-day month,
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the discharged soldier would be required to reimburse the Army about $9.95. These
charges over the winter left the average private $3.00 a month. This did not include
whatever charges the discharged men were accruing at the Sutler’s store. The potential
of having no money to pay passage home was very real.
The growing unrest of the ex-soldiers stranded in the camp had other effects that
would prove to bring about a negative outcome. Lt. Hogan had laced his early letters
with comments about the free-flowing alcohol at Camp Cooke. In one letter to Andrew
O’Connell, he offered “all the luxuries that camp can afford, not forgetting some good
old bourbon.”32 In another, he boasted, “we always have in camp plenty of whisky and
cigars.”33 With the problem of discharged soldiers marooned at the post and apparently
feeling that alcohol consumption led to an increase in dissent and a decrease in morale,
Major Clinton took more extreme action. On February 6, he declared that Camp Cooke
would become a “dry” post. In a letter, given the strength of law, and signed by the post
adjutant, he stated, “The Commanding Officer directs me to day that after the present
supply of liquor now on hand is disposed of by the Sutler, no more will be permitted to
be sold.”34
Some of these discharged men had begun openly questioning the actions and the
orders issued by the officers of the post, including Clinton. A career officer like Clinton
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would have viewed this as treason, at the very least. Major Clinton’s later orders went
further. He restricted the speech of the released soldiers, limited their contact with the
enlisted men, and threatened them with arrest for seditious activities.
While dealing with the issue of the stranded, discharged soldiers, Clinton
continued to send out limited patrols during a harsh winter. Despite this activity, the
news media heated up with attacks on the Army and Camp Cooke. Two articles in the
April 6, 1867, Montana Post leveled criticism at the Army for its placement of Camp
Cooke. A letter, believed to have been written by someone within the camp, attacked the
Army for placing the post on the Judith River. It further chastised the Army for not
providing adequate protection to the people and then criticized the people of Montana for
not doing more to demand that the Army move the post from its present location. The
writer addressed the letter from “Fort Cook.” This is inaccurate in two ways, since the
post was not a fort and the correct spelling was “Cooke” not Cook.
In this letter, the author first questioned why it had taken so long for the
government to send help to the people of Montana to assist in warding off the attacks of
the “Indian outrages.” It also questioned why the people of Montana had not demanded
more loudly the help they richly deserved and needed for the territory to be settled and
the great wealth taken from the land, as her “future greatness” demanded. It finished
with a direct attack on Camp Cooke:
Fort Cook, lately built, and situated upon a gentle rise of narrow table land,
bordering the Missouri river, stands out in bold relief to the passing steamer,
but a view taken of it from the ghastly bluffs surrounding it discloses instantly
its defects and uselessness as a military post. Therefore little, if anything can

39

be said favorable concerning this site as a point from which to derive any
assistance. Much might be said, but justly, too, concerning the unpardonable
stupidity of the shallow-brained engineers who located it in such an obscure
position, unvisited by man or beast. It is to be hoped the Government will
soon notice its defects, and out-of-the-way situation, and dispose of it
accordingly.
Fort Cook, M.T. Dec. 29, 1866
PRO BONO PUBLICO 35
The second Montana Post article, in the April 6 edition, reported on a February 10
incident at Camp Cooke. Private Jos. W. Synder was on guard duty, after dark, as a
sentinel near the stables. Indians hiding in the area shot him with arrows, killing him.
An attack right in the post must have been unnerving to the soldiers. Major Clinton sent
out a search party the next morning that tracked the private’s killers about ten miles, but
they lost the trail in the deep snow. The prevalent winds blowing across the eastern
slopes of the foothills would have quickly covered any tracks. The bone-numbing
temperatures also must have dampened enthusiasm for the chase and chilled any revenge
felt by the soldiers in the manhunt.
In his written report, Major Clinton said the scouting party lost the trail “in the
vicinity of the Bear’s Paw Mountains.”
Cemetery records show Synder was thirty-five years of age and from New Jersey.
A front-page Montana Post article treated the soldier’s death with measured disrespect
and a taunting humor.

A soldier was killed while standing guard on a dark night lately at Camp
Cook, by a Blood Indian. The writer says that “speaking ‘halt’ to an Indian on
a dark night is poor business – it won’t do!”36
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Perhaps in view of the incident with Private Snyder, and in order to better protect
the officers and men of Camp Cooke, during the late part of the winter, Major Clinton
assigned Captain Wainwright, Lieutenant Corr, and nine enlisted men the duty of
mapping a military reservation for the post. Camp Cooke’s original orders had only
specified “the mouth of the Judith River” as a location. The post needed actual
boundaries to ensure adequate supplies of wood for building and burning. The army
would want to protect whatever grass supply was available for grazing animals and to
define the post’s borders to keep homesteaders and Indians from settling too close to the
post.
After completion of the survey, Major Clinton sent his report to Department
Headquarters at Fort Rice on March 10, 1867. In his communication, he explained the
reasons for mapping the reservation at that time were “to ensure an adequate supply of
timber for future building and for heating and cooking purposes.” He added, “I felt it
necessary to make the survey at this time to prevent squatters from settling on land that
would be indispensible to the post should it be continued.”37 This is the first indication
that Camp Cooke might become more than a temporary winter camp.
Clinton estimated the reservation to encompass twenty square miles. The land
covered almost two miles of river bank on both sides of the Missouri, including, on the
east side of the river, the width of the prairie on which the camp resided and back to the
hills. It continued along the Judith River up the stream, on both sides, for ten miles. This
37
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would give the entire reservation a shape roughly like an “L” with the vertical line
leaning in about forty degrees to the right.

Figure 10. Approximate layout of Camp Cooke reservation – Red square
represents post. Dotted lines represent courses of Missouri and
Judith Rivers. Description of “L” shape is from Missouri
point of view.
Acting Governor Thomas Francis Meagher’s tirade against Camp Cooke and the
Army had come to a temporary halt as a new Governor came to the Territory. In the
latter part of 1866, President Andrew Johnson appointed Green Clay Smith as Territorial
Governor of Montana. Smith replaced the resigned Edgerton and the Acting Governor
Meagher. Gov. Smith was a Major General in the Civil War, a Congressional
Representative from Kentucky who later ran for President of the United States on the
Prohibition ticket in 1876.
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Figure 11. Major General Green Clay Smith, second Territorial Governor
of Montana. (www.arlingtoncemetery.net/gcsmith.htm)
Green Clay Smith arrived in Montana on October 3, 1866. Residents liked him
immediately. The citizenry found him friendly and approachable. Many thought he was
more open than Meagher had been. Smith’s reputation as a Prohibitionist, in opposition
to Meagher’s less desirable one as a wild-tempered, often out-of-control drunkard,
offered the hope of stability and order in territorial government. However, in the spring
of 1867, he left the territory to lobby in Washington, D.C. While Smith was in
Washington, Secretary Thomas Francis Meagher resumed the duties of acting territorial
governor. He also took on the role of Territorial Director of Indian Affairs. Meagher
immediately resumed his demands on the military for more protection and soldiers in
Montana.
Shortly after again resuming his duties as the territorial governor, Meagher wrote
to Maj. Clinton, requesting him to send soldiers to the Gallatin area, where he feared an
Indian “uprising” was about to take place. He attempted to manipulate the major into a
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favorable decision by simultaneously publishing his letter in The Montana Post on April
13, 1867.
I entreat you to dispatch at least two Companies of your Battalion, with all
possible expedition to Bozeman City. Information, which to my mind sadly
reliable, indicate that point as the one which, at any moment after the spring
breaks, may be violently assailed by the Indians.38
Clinton responded in a manner that played right into the hands of the consummate
politician. In his response to Gov. Meagher, Clinton attempted to explain to him that the
area of the Gallatin (now Bozeman, Montana) was out of his official command and
control, and Army rules did not allow him the prerogative to send troops to that location.
In Clinton’s words, as a military man, he told the governor, “even had I the will, I do not
have the authority.”39
Meagher seized the opportunity to use this against the military and Clinton. He
again published his letter, along with Clinton’s response in all three papers now available
in the territory. The two papers in Virginia City, The Montana Post and Montana
Democrat, and the Montana Radiator of Helena carried both letters and companion
stories in issues at the end of April. The Montana Post added an editorial that branded
Clinton as a coward.
Major Clinton commands the only effective body of troops in Montana. Eight
hundred and fifty in number, six hundred of whom are camped at the mouth of
the Judith river, guarding a grove of cottonwood trees against the attack of the
“badlands” hundreds of miles in extent over which even the whippoorwill has
to carry rations…No settlements are within sixty miles…General Meagher
premised his letter with a request that the commander would furnish a
detachment for the Gallatin, if not in violation of his instructions. Major
38

Montana Post, (Virginia City, M.T. April 13, 1867).
Major William Clinton to Acting Governor Thomas Francis Meagher, Letter, April 17,
1867, Letters Sent 8/1866-12/1869. Camp Cooke, Montana Territory, Group 393, ARC Identifier
656994, MLR #A1-5 92- 1, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
39

44

Clinton reads him a lecture on Army Regulations. He could not comply with
the request, even “had he the will”, “Aye, there’s the rub”.40
Another letter, published in May and directed at Clinton, might have resulted in a
court martial, if it was accurate. Even if only a portion of the claims was true, the Major
should have been replaced in his command, immediately.
….today I have read Major Clinton’s heartless refusal to render assistance.
Unquestionably, the purple visage of the military gentleman blanched to
snowy whiteness after he had read General Meagher’s request…How
cautiously he has digested the MIGHTS and IFS. No! HE will not consent to
be whipped into detail. Are not the U.S. Army the servants of the People?
Major Clinton may think otherwise – I presume he does. I am informed Mr.
Clinton is an exacting, cruel man. The other day a discharged soldier, because
he refused to salute the officers, was sent, bed, wife and baggage away from
the reservation. During the winter, a sentinel was shot while on his post, by
Indians. Mr. Clinton, I am informed by accurate authority, cursed the dying
man and heaped abuses on him…A man whose mind is as stagnant as Mr.
Clinton’s is not fit to command, I don’t believe, even at Camp Cooke.41
The article went on to say the soldier and family took refuge at Coal Banks. This
seems unlikely. Coal Banks Landing was an area where miners extracted a low-grade
lignite coal from thin veins. Riverboats used this coal to supplement the wood in heating
their steam boilers. Clinton sent a military detail to Coal Banks to protect the miners
from sporadic raids by Indians. If Clinton really was the martinet this article professed
him to be, then the soldiers at Coal Banks would not have dared to incur his anger by
sheltering people he banished from the post.
Despite such attacks on the Army and personal accusations against himself,
Clinton continued with the military mission and dispatched soldiers from Camp Cooke to
set up mail stops across the central part of the Montana Territory. The widening presence
40
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of soldiers in blue across the Montana landscape added more services for the citizens of
the territory, but did nothing to quell the ever-growing attitudes against the post. In
addition to the construction that had begun on a new post at Sun River, a letter in April
1867 from Clinton addressed to Captain Charles Webb indicated that another temporary
post had been set up a month earlier near the site of St. Peter’s Mission. This Catholic
Church, built in the 1850s by Jesuit priests and Ursuline nuns, was located about fifteen
miles outside the current town of Cascade, Montana and sixty-five miles from Fort
Benton.
The mission had been established to bring Catholicism to the Blackfeet tribe, who
had a concentrated population in that area. Following the signing of the Lame Bull
Treaty in 1855, the Blackfeet surrendered large portions of the central part of Montana to
the Nez Percé and Salish tribes. In exchange, the Federal government promised them
schools and certain annuity payments. The mission served as a church, and as a school to
educate the Blackfeet Nation’s children. The purpose of the Army post near the mission
was two-fold. St. Peter’s Mission was on the mail route between Helena and Fort
Benton, and it was close enough to the Blackfeet to monitor their movements.
Continuing the expansion of the Army presence, in May 1867, Clinton issued
Special Orders 58. He directed 1st Lieutenant Horr to take a company of men and prepare
a mail station on the Dearborn River. This was also located on the route between Fort
Benton and Helena. Indian raids had been noted in the area, so Clinton gave orders for
the detail to equip itself for a one-month assignment and to “be prepared to defend
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against attacks by Indians and to protect any of the regular mail trains or travelers from
dangers perpetrated by the hostiles.”42
In the midst of all these activities, notice came that a payday would finally arrive.
On Thursday, April 30, the paymaster arrived at Camp Cooke and the men mustered for
pay at 8:00 am. General Orders 13 instructed all soldiers to prepare for inspection,
“except Charcoalburners, hospital attendants, saw mill-men and bakers.”43 During the
months the soldiers and ex-soldiers had been waiting for their pay, Major Clinton had
dealt with the grumbling and caustic comments by clamping down on the contact time
former soldiers had with the enlisted men. He had closed the tavern in the Sutler’s store,
and restricted the movements of the discharged soldiers during the day.
On April 29, the day before payday, Clinton issued General Orders 14. This
further limited the movement of discharged soldiers and gave measured consequences for
their actions. The orders directed all officers to “be aware of discharged men in the habit
of discussing the legality of orders issued by these Head Quarters.” 44 All discharged
soldiers were required to line up to the left of their former companies at the evening
retreat. Clinton must have sternly looked on as company commanders followed his
direction in reading the 60th Article of War to their companies that evening before the
paymaster would finally dispense their long-awaited greenbacks.
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All sutlers and retainers to the camp, and all persons whatsoever, serving with
the armies of the United States in the field, though not enlisted soldiers, are to
be subject to orders, according to the rules and discipline of war.45
In short, this article of war allowed a post commander, with adequate provocation,
to bring military charges leading to a general court martial against any discharged soldier
still residing on a military installation. While this threat may have lowered the vocal
level of complaint, it did not quell the underlying dissatisfaction of the men who were
waiting for pay and a riverboat home. Following the payday, several riverboats stopped
at the post, picking up soldiers heading up or down the river. Later communications by
Clinton and his successor revealed that not all of the men who departed had actually been
discharged. Desertions were heavy in the Montana posts, and Camp Cooke was certainly
not immune. Of the thirty-four courts martial records that exist for Camp Cooke, threequarters of them are for desertion or “absence without leave.” While there is no clear
way to determine the attitudes of the soldiers following this payday and the exodus of the
discharged soldiers, there is a gap in disciplinary activities, as recorded by court martials,
for several months.
By June, construction of the post at Sun River was well under way and the Army
named it Camp Reynolds. In an apparent belief that Clinton’s experience in building a
post without relying on civilian labor might be useful, District Headquarters at Fort Rice
transferred Maj. Clinton to Camp Reynolds, where he assumed command. The new
officer in charge of Camp Cooke was Lt. Col. (Brevet Colonel) George L. Andrews. He
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took command of the post on June 8, 1867, announcing his arrival in a short and to-thepoint statement:
Headquarters Camp Cooke, M.T. June 8th 1867
General Orders No 23.
The undersigned hereby assumes Command of this Post.
Geo. L. Andrews.
Lt. Col. 13th Infantry
Bvt. Col. USA46

Figure 12. Copy of original document General Orders 23, June 8, 1867, signed
by Lt. Col. George L. Andrews as he assumed command of
Camp Cooke (from microfilm obtained through National
Archives, Washington, D.C.)
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Figure 13. Lt. Col George L. Andrews (photo from History of the Thirteenth
Regiment, United States Infantry by U.G. McAlexander
Regimental Press, 1905)
Andrews’ first duties as commander involved signing the orders that transferred
almost half his command to follow Major Clinton to Sun River. Special Orders 75
assigned four of the eight companies to Camp Reynolds, including the company that had
already been on duty there since September the previous year. This move left Camp
Cooke with half its original complement of soldiers and it was still responsible for all the
duties it had taken on. With soldiers assigned to Fort Benton, St. Peter’s Mission, Coal
Banks, and The Springs, the actual staff on hand at the post would be down to about one
hundred seventy-five of the previous almost seven hundred who came up the Missouri
River the year before. For those remaining at Camp Cooke, the empty barracks and
added duties would have made the post on the Judith more isolated and difficult than it
had been before. If there was a bright spot, it might be that the soldiers remaining at
Camp Cooke were ready to see what life would be like with a new commander. The
overbearing rule of Major Clinton had ended and a new officer in charge would be given
a chance.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
A NEW COMMANDER – POLITICS AND DEATH
Even Clinton’s departure from Camp Cooke did not end the personal attacks on
him by the press. The June 29, 1867, issue of The Montana Post published, somewhat
reluctantly, a retraction of an earlier article. Included as an afterthought in a report about
selling beef to Camp Cooke was the following sentence:
P.S. It is said the report of Major Clinton Killing a soldier on the road to Sun
river is all a conard* 47
On July 27, 1867, the War Department officially renamed Camp Reynolds as Fort
Shaw to honor Colonel Robert Shaw, a Civil War hero who commanded the famous
Massachusetts 54th Regiment – the first all-Black unit in the Army’s history. Army
Records list Major William Clinton as the first commander of the post. Orders
appointing Clinton were dated in May from District Headquarters at Fort Rice, and he
took command at Sun River during the third week of June.
A decision was made to move the Regimental Headquarters, originally located at
Fort Rice, Dakota Territory, to Fort Shaw. While the Army constructed the appropriate
buildings at Fort Shaw, the Headquarters were temporarily moved to Camp Cooke in
June 1867. It remained there for about one month before Colonel I.V.N. Reeve made the
final transfer to Fort Shaw on August 11, 1867. He believed this would provide a quicker

47

The Montana Post (Virginia City, Montana Territory, June 29, 1867)

* [absurd or exaggerated report – false statement or rumor: definition provided Webster’s
Unabridged Dictionary 1989 Edition ]

51

response time for him, as commander of the Montana soldiers to deal with situations
within the territory.
Adding further to its geographic isolation, Camp Cooke was on the east side of
the Missouri River. All other posts and most patrols were on the western side of the
river. The soldiers at Camp Cooke built a ferry to cross the Missouri at the northwest
corner of the camp, near the blacksmith and sawmill. Three kinds of ferry boats were
used in the 1860s. These included oar, rope, and pole ferries. All three used rafts
secured to both banks with ropes. The post’s ferry had guide ropes running along the
water line. There was enough slack in the line to allow the riverboats to pass over
without hanging up on the rope. Unless the river was frozen, the ferry was the only
means of transportation across the river, as the current was usually too deep for fording
with a wagon and often too swift to swim across with horses.
During this transitory period of a change in Headquarters locations, and while at
Camp Cooke, Department Commander I.V.N. Reeve, following directions from the War
Department in Washington, D.C., sent out a directive regarding the distribution of
ammunition and gunpowder to Indians deemed to be “friendlies.” Considering the
regular filing of newspaper articles with blazing headlines about Indian attacks and
“depredations by savages,” the determination of which Indian was “friendly” and which
was “hostile” would seem to have been a difficult distinction. This news could not have
come to the soldiers at Camp Cooke with any joy. Lt. Col Andrews issued Special
Orders 81, dated June 20, 1867, and specified what each “friendly” Indian would receive:
To each Indian who has a gun, not to exceed per month: One pound powder,
two pounds of ball, shot or lead, one hundred and twenty-five percussion caps.
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In accordance with War Department instructions, the orders further stipulated that
all transactions would take place in Fort Benton and the agent-in-charge would keep a
register and send a copy of this register monthly to Camp Cooke. This took control away
from the soldiers at Camp Cooke, providing them with less security and forcing them to
trust the sometimes questionable honesty of civilian merchants. In any given month, no
Indian tribe would receive more than two hundred pounds of powder, four hundred
pounds of balls, shot, or lead, and 25,000 percussion caps.48 It should be noted, however,
that ammunition was of the old musket type and did not include anything that could be
used in cartridge guns or rifles.
In view of this action by the Army, it seems ironic that Acting Governor Meagher
was, at the same time, writing the General of the Army, Ulysses S. Grant, asking for
more help in fighting the “hostiles.” Meagher had bypassed General Sherman, the
commander of Department of the Missouri, and wired a telegram directly to Grant. His
telegram was wildly alarmist. He announced that Indians were running rampant in the
territory and no citizen was safe. He claimed the lives of the populous were in constant
danger and the limited and isolated military force that was currently on duty in the
territory was completely inadequate to protect the people or stem the tide of destruction
and widespread slaughter in the territory was imminent. Meagher asked for weapons,
training, and funds to raise a civilian militia.
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Grant forwarded the telegram to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton with a note
recommending immediate action. He also added his opinion that Stanton should see to it
that Congress, not the military, pay for the expense of arming Meagher’s militia. General
Grant won his point of view. Following orders, General Sherman telegraphed Meagher.
The government would authorize the Territory to raise a volunteer force of 800 men to
serve for three months. The army would send 2,500 muskets and ammunition up the
river by boat. Until that time, Meagher’s militia had to provide their own weapons and
ammunition and would be paid forty cents per day (actually less than a private made).
Meagher was authorized to charge rations and supplies, and the government would later
pay expenses when Meagher provided certified receipts. By late June, the Montana
Militia had 150 members. Meagher wired Sherman that he was having difficulties raising
a sufficient force of men under the conditions the government had imposed. Competent
fighting men did not wish to leave their homes and use their own weapons and
ammunition for what he considered an insufficient sum of forty cents a day.
Sherman had little respect for the acting governor. He had crossed paths with
Meagher during the war and thought him an alarmist and grandstander seeking to raise
his own image, possibly for future political gain, at the Army and Montana’s expense.
He ordered Major W.H. Lewis from Utah to go into Montana to investigate what was
happening and ignored Meagher, using Lewis to communicate with the governor.
The Montana Militia made expeditions into the Gallatin basin but did not
encounter any Indian bands. Near the end of June, Sherman sent a telegram to inform
Meagher that the previously promised muskets would arrive by riverboat in late June or
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early July. Meagher acknowledged the telegram and added a request that Gen.
Sherman order the commanding officer of Camp Cooke to attach a company of infantry
to his militia. It was a request that Sherman ignored.
Near the end of June, Meagher traveled by riverboat to Fort Benton to claim the
weapons shipment from the U.S. government. During the trip, the governor had reported
feeling unwell, and he spent several days on shore recovering from a fever. With his
reputation, there were those who claimed it was more likely a hangover. At any rate,
Meagher arrived at the docks at Fort Benton to take possession of the rifles for the
Montana militia. He boarded the steamboat G.A. Thompson, and after being shown to his
cabin, next door to the captain’s, he retired for the evening to await the arrival of the
muskets from Camp Cooke the next day.
The final hours of Thomas Francis Meagher’s life remains a mystery. At some
point in the evening of July 1, 1867, the acting Governor of the Montana Territory and
head of the Montana Militia evidently fell overboard and simply disappeared.
Speculation ran rampant, and there were rumors of heavy drinking. Some believed
Indians had crept onto the boat and overpowered Meagher, tossing him into the river.
His handling of the militia had given rise to a belief that disgruntled volunteers might
have been responsible. Still others believed his heavy-handed methods with the
legislature had been his undoing. The Helena Weekly Herald issued a supplement to
publish the story of the Meagher tragedy.
After our forms were closed for the press, this morning passengers by the
stage from Fort Benton brought the thrilling and very sad news of the
untimely death of Gen. Thomas Francis Meagher. He having went on board
the steamer C.A. Thompson, lying at the levee, to spend the evening and night
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of the 1st inst. With some friends, was heard to get up from his couch, during
the night, and go out from his stateroom on to the guards. Upon hearing a
splashing sound in the water, the passengers rushed out to find that one who
had stood foremost among the truly brilliant of our country, and he who had
taken so prominent part in the administrative affairs of our young territory –
winning all hearts by his nobleness of nature and purpose – had been swept
down the terrible torrent, perhaps never again to be recovered, even in death.49
The pilot of the C. A. Thompson, Johnny Doran, reported at the inquest that at the
time of the governor’s disappearance, the current of the Missouri was flowing at ten
miles an hour and the water was twelve feet deep. He described it as “instant death.”
Searchers dragged the river and checked the banks on both sides for weeks. The
territorial government even offered a reward of $1,000 for Meagher’s body, but searchers
never found his remains.
Governor Green Clay Smith returned to the territory and assumed command of
the Montana Militia. Under his control, it reached a maximum of 513 men and officers.
During its short life, the militia failed to engage in a single skirmish against Indians. It
was quietly disbanded before the end of the year, having suffered substantial desertions
by the militiamen.
The regular military experienced the same problem with desertion rates. At Camp
Cooke they reached epidemic levels. The problem seemed to be ongoing, though it
always took on more dramatic numbers after the infrequent visit of the paymaster. A
letter from the Camp Cooke post commander, Lt. Col. Andrews, to Fort Rice addressed
these problems and underlying causes in some detail:
I have the honor to report that since payment of the troops at this post,
desertions are quite frequent and I am informed by Lieut. Hogan, 31 Inf., from
49
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Sun River, that in one night seven left and in the next night twelve men
deserted from there.
I can account for it but one way, principally from the fact that the men have
just received from fourteen to sixteen months of pay and that the probabilities
are that a year will lapse before another payment is made.
A steamer arrived here yesterday with a detachment of recruits for the 13th Inf.
From the officers I learned that when about one day’s run below here, the
steamer was hailed by five solders, but as soon as the hailers discovered the
soldiers on board, they ran away and disappeared. 50
Added to this difficulty was Colonel Andrews’ review of the standing policy
regarding alcoholic beverages at the post. Andrews revised Major Clinton’s orders that
made Camp Cooke a dry post. A literal interpretation of Lt. Col. Andrews’ orders would
indicate that he lifted the ban on officers, allowing them the privilege to possess alcohol.
Enlisted men who wanted a drink at the Sutler’s store would require permission from
their company commander, co-signed by the post commander. This “division between
the ranks” would not have set well with the enlisted men. Knowing their ability to take
an occasional drink and lessen the feelings of isolation and worry that encompassed life
at Camp Cooke rested on the whim of an officer above them would not be reassuring and
would undoubtedly harbor some anger in a few.
The Sutler at this post is prohibited from selling anything that will produce
intoxication to Enlisted men, Discharged Soldiers or Employees of the
garrison except on the written order of their immediate commander approved
with the autograph of the commanding officer of the post.51
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In July, Pvt. David Trihy stood before his second Courts Martial board in a year.
In the previous year, Major Clinton had court martialed Trihy for desertion. For reasons
defined only as improper procedure, Trihy’s conviction was overturned. In 1867, Pvt.
Trihy was accused in a conspiracy to murder his detachment commander at Fort Benton,
Captain Ferdinand DeCourcy. According to the Court Martial report, the Fort Benton
detachment in which Trihy served had been given the name of “Camp Clinton.”
According to the charges, while at Camp Clinton he had conspired with two other
soldiers to kill Captain DeCourcy and steal a payroll he was holding. He denied any plan
or attempt to kill Captain DeCourcey. Witnesses were questioned who painted a picture
of hearsay and second-hand conversations in Fort Benton bars. The alleged plotters
denied any knowledge of it and claimed to have no idea of what was being asked of them.
Eventually, the board dropped the conspiracy charge.
The soldiers at Camp Cooke were living a life filled with the uncertainties of an
isolated frontier post. They found themselves cut off from outside communication part of
the year by the weather, infrequent mail service, no telegraph, and little to do except for
infrequent patrols and even less frequent calls for assistance to aid in Indian matters. It
was becoming more obvious that Camp Cooke’s location had been a mistake on the part
of Army planning.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
SARAH CANFIELD AND WOMEN IN THE WEST
A different aspect of life at Camp Cooke presented itself in July 1867. The wife
of Lieutenant Andrew Canfield arrived at Camp Cooke. She lived at the post from July
1867 until July 1868. Sarah Canfield’s diary covers her life in the west from 1866 to
1868. She provided a perspective on camp life at this post that military records do not
reveal. Upon her arrival on July 18, Sarah wrote that the post currently housed seven
companies of soldiers, but two were leaving immediately for Fort Shaw. She noted four
other officers’ wives living at the camp. These were Mrs. Andrews, the commanding
officer’s wife; the wives of Captains Robert Nugent and Patrick Horrigan; and the wife of
Lieutenant William Auman.
Mrs. Canfield’s July 20, 1867 diary entry offers a better picture of the post
buildings than the military reports did.
This fort is built in design like all I have seen with bastions Stockade moat etc,
but there is considerable timber on the river bottoms and so there is a sawmill
here and the rows of houses are framed of wood and filled in with ‘adobe’
bricks which are made by mixing the natural earth and water to the right
consistency then shaped into bricks about ten inches long and about six inches
wide and thick which are then left in the sun until thoroughly dry when they
are laid in a mortar made of this same earth – the roofs of these houses are
made of poles laid at intervals coming to a peak in the centre than brush laid
over the poles and a foot or more of earth spread over all…The walls of the
rooms were whitewashed and the floors are rough board. When carpeted they
make nice cozy homes. Mrs. Andrews is a middle-aged lady with one son, a
young man now in school in the East. Mrs. Nugent has three children. Mrs.
Horrigan and Mrs. Auman are like myself – recent brides.52
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Five days later, she wrote of her first meal in her new home with her husband. Their
quarters consisted of three rooms. They purchased furniture, dishes, a mirror, and
enough carpet for the front room from a passing riverboat. Captain Horrigan, the
previous tenant, had left for Fort Shaw.
We ate our first meal at home this morning. Had a loaf of bread and a can of
turkey (no salt) a can of tomatoes and coffee without sugar or cream, but we
enjoyed it and later we bought all we wanted at the commissary – our table
was a good box and our chairs cracker boxes. 53

Figure 14
Andrew Nahum Canfield
Sarah E. Canfield
Taken when a private in 1862
Photo taken in 1866
From “An Army Wife on the Upper Missouri,” North Dakota Hist. Vol. 20,
No. 4, Oct 1953
Military wives in the nineteenth century army were given no status, be they
soldiers wives or officers wives. Housing was usually issued to a soldier by his rank, and
could even be determined by the day of his rank. A Lieutenant with five or six years of
rank could be forced out of his home and even into barracks by a Captain who had just
received his promotion orders. A single First Lieutenant could make a married Second
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Lieutenant move from three or four room housing into one or two room housing with no
more than a day’s notice. Furniture usually consisted of odds-and-ends, whatever the
previous tenants may have left, or items the new tenants purchased from a local source.
For those at Camp Cooke, the passing riverboats were the only outside source.
In August, she wrote that they had experienced hard rain lasting several days.
Weaknesses in the structure of the construction began to appear. Mrs. Nugent’s sod roof
had leaked and she was horrified to find her three-month-old baby lying in a crib with
muddy water dripping into its face.
During these first months at Camp Cooke, Sarah Canfield’s diary recorded two
events involving death. On September 5, she noted an attack occurred near the post.
Indian raiders came within a quarter mile of the camp, drove off all the beef cattle and
some horses, and killed one man. A patrol sent after them returned empty-handed.
Cemetery records for Camp Cooke do not show a death for September 5, and record no
burial until September 11. On September 12, Sarah writes that Thomas Little, a recently
arrived officer, and his wife had lost their infant child. Colonel Andrews officiated at a
short service, and a prayer was spoken by all attending. Of the event, she wrote, “It must
be very hard to leave the tiny body in that desolate place – with a few others.” Again, the
cemetery records do not mention the burial of a child on that date.
A December entry in Sarah Canfield’s diary closed the year with a bit of fear, but
humor as well. She wrote that in the night a drum began to sound the alarm, and a guard
fired a shot near the stables. A desperate search by armed men looking for Indians
“sneaking about” revealed a hog belonging to Col. Nugent that slipped out of his pen and
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wandered around the post. Still, she closed her diary for the year of 1867 with the words,
“we live in continual fear of attack.” 54
Sarah Canfield’s world, while she lived at Camp Cooke, always revolved in a
close proximity to the post. Only on two occasions did she mention leaving the confines
of Camp Cooke. During a summer afternoon, she described a short stroll with her
husband along the banks of the Judith River. The next spring she wrote about watching
the ice break up along the Missouri.
We have spent the most of the day on the river bank looking at the ice go out.
The river is about half a mile wide and the ice breaks and comes down on a
swift currant rushes piles up in great piles on again tumbling and tossing
constantly….The ice was above 15 hours going out.55
Yet throughout most communications, that line from December 1867 seemed to
be an underlying feeling at Camp Cooke: “we live in continual fear of attack.”
At other posts throughout the west, there often seemed to be a different feeling.
At one New Mexico post, an officer’s wife wrote home telling her parents the
only Indians she had seen were ones who came into a general store in a nearby town
when she and another officer’s wife were buying fabric. At Fort Abraham Lincoln, in the
Dakota Territory, Elizabeth Custer, Katie Garrett, and Katie’s sister Mollie rode out with
a group of officers who were entertaining themselves with a buffalo hunt. Mollie stopped
to remove a stone from her horse’s hoof, unaware the buffalo had changed direction and
were heading straight at her. Katie calmly pulled a rifle from her saddle’s scabbard, and
took careful aim and shot the leading buffalo, turning the herd once again, and saving her
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sister’s life. She later commented that was the worst danger she had experienced. In
Arizona, during the early 1870s, soldiers of the Sixth Cavalry at Fort Lowell established a
baseball league between the posts that held games including both White and “Colored”
teams.56 They found the reservation Indians to be no threat.
While many women were terrified of Indians and the dangers they may cause,
some adapted. Upon her arrival at Fort Laramie in 1868, Ada Vogdes wrote: “I am
frightened to death nearly every evening, when the sun goes down, until it rises up the
next a.m.” 57 Two months later, she was having dinner with local Indian chiefs, could
speak a few words of their language, and was on friendly terms with Lakota Chief Red
Cloud.
The wives of soldiers coming west often expected the worst. Stories in
newspapers and pulp magazines often wrote of the “bloodthirsty savage” raiding across
the west and killing, looting, and raping at every opportunity. At some posts, fear of
Indian behavior was a very real reaction. In some forts, there was no fear and the
Army/Indian relationship was almost on a mutually respectful level. Camp Cooke
isolated and nearly one hundred miles from the nearest settlement did not give any
reassurances to its residents. Sarah Canfield grew to fear the possibility of Indian attack.
When it did happen, just a few months later in 1868, she and the other women begged
that their officer husbands kill them rather than allow them to fall into the hands of the
Indians should the post fall.
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CHAPTER SIX:
INDIAN ACTIVITIES INCREASE – A SUMMER POST IS BUILT
Messages arrived at Camp Cooke regarding attacks by Sioux and Piegan bands on
mail routes to the east. This was in an area where soldiers had not been actively guarding
the trails. The Indians were harassing the couriers and stealing mailbags. On September
5, 1867, Lieutenant Colonel Andrews sent Lieutenant Horrigan, recently returned from
Fort Shaw, to check on a mail station on the Milk River, sixty miles to the northeast of
the post. The area around this mail station had been reporting the most raids. Ten days
later, Andrews sent out another patrol, led by Brevet Major Corr to join with Horrigan
and be prepared to fight any bands of unfriendly Indians they may find. Horrigan and
Corr’s patrols returned to Camp Cooke later in September, failing to encounter any
Indians.
Meanwhile, in November, word came by newspaper that a band of Sioux warriors
held up two mail couriers on a route north of Camp Cooke, and searched the mail
destroying some of it. They allowed the two carriers to leave with a warning never to
return.
Fred Ratschmann and Dave -, men employed by C.C. Huntley to carry
Northern mail, left Fort Hawley near the Musselshell for Helena. They had
two horses and four sacks of mail…They did not suppose the Indians had any
hostile intentions against them, so when they held up their hands to stop, they
rode on. The Indians had no difficulty in overtaking them, surrounding them
and compelling them to dismount. This done, they robbed them of everything
but their clothing and then held a long council on whether they should be
executed.58
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When allowed to depart, the mail agents picked up what mail they could, quickly
departed on the two horses the Indian allowed them to keep and did not stop until they
reached their destination of Helena. They reported the Indians were “well dressed and
armed with Spencer rifles.”59 Patrols from Camp Cooke again failed to find any trace of
the Indians.
Soldiers were sent out on patrols, searching for Indian raiding parties on a regular
basis and constantly had to report, on returning to the post, no success in their
assignment. The troopers at Camp Cooke would have heard the rumors of attacks on
soldiers near other posts to the east, which would have led them to a growing fear that an
attack was going to come.
The reports of Indian attacks and the fears of confrontations did not decrease over
the winter. Newspaper attacks on Camp Cooke continued to intimate that the soldiers on
the Judith could not take care of themselves in a fight. In February, a Helena paper
welcomed the additions of Fort Shaw and Fort Ellis, but it still insisted Camp Cooke was
a mistake.
A regiment of soldiers is stationed in Montana. The garrison at Fort Shaw
protects the Sun River and Dearborn passes, that at Fort Ellis the Bozeman
and Blackfoot passes, but the much larger one at Camp Cook, by being badly
located, is to all intents and purpose isolated, remote and utterly useless to
Montana or the Government. 60
It also appeared that interaction with Indian groups might have been more
frequent than written communications indicated. In February, Andrews issued a directive
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addressing dogs within the post. General Orders 4, February 16, ordered troops to shoot
any dog found on the parade grounds during a parade. These orders also instructed
soldiers to shoot any Indian dog they found on the post “at any time” immediately.
While no other communication or letter discusses this situation, question arises from
where the “Indian dogs” would have come.
Newspapers also reported that Piegan and Blood Indians plagued the riverboats
and harassed the miners at Coal Banks, and that Indian raids were becoming more
violent. Colonel Andrews issued a severe warning to soldiers stationed at the Coal Banks
area, guarding the miners.
To the Non Commissioned Officer
In Charge of Guard at Coal Bank
Your party are forbidden to leave the Coal Banks on any pretense whatever
until relieved, and you are required to keep one sentinel constantly on post
from sunset to sunrise, and more than one if there should be Indians
discovered in the vicinity.
If the station be visited by Indians even though few in numbers, you will keep
on their approach, call your men together (at their quarters with their arms at
hand) and will so remain during the presence of the Indians, but will make no
hostile demonstrations toward them except for self protection.
Parties of Indians will not be allowed to stay at the Coal Banks over night.
These instructions will be carefully preserved and turned over to the Non.
Comd. Officer who relieves you, his receipt for them will be taken, and turned
over to the Post adjutant by you, upon your return to this post. along with a
report from you to me on what kind of difficulty this would have actually
caused in the camp. 61
In view of the increased Indian activity along the river, the Army decided to build
a summer outpost downstream on the Missouri from Camp Cooke at or near the mouth of
the Musselshell River. This spot, some sixty-five miles east of Camp Cooke, was located
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near Cow Island. Over the years, this had been a trouble-spot where Indians struck
settlers crossing the Missouri at a natural passage across the river.
Many Newspaper reports accused Indians of killing settlers and stealing their
horses and cattle at this oval sandbar in the middle of the Missouri River. A temporary
camp near the Musselshell might prevent Indian raids by giving soldiers a quicker
response time. While the river was still frozen and snow covered the shaded areas,
Andrews sent out patrols to examine ground along the eastern banks of the Missouri
toward Cow Island and the mouth of the Musselshell River looking for routes to drive
wagons and cattle down stream.
In early March, Lieutenant Colonel Andrews sent a letter to Fort Shaw, reporting
the results of his scouting trips down the Missouri River below Camp Cooke.
I have examined the country about this post, say eight or ten miles up “Dog
Creek” and do not think wagons can be taken out of the bed of the Creek or
that they can be taken up the Creek more than 3 or 4 miles, as it is very
crooked winding from one side to the other of the ravine, through which it
runs, and in many places the banks are from 10 to 15 feet high and about
perpendicular. I have also examined the country for 10 miles up the Judith
and know of but one place where there is any hope of making a road up the
bluffs. Ten days hard work by a hundred men might make a practicable road,
when the ground is dry62
In the next several weeks, Andrews wrote letters to Fort Shaw detailing efforts to
find a guide to take men down the banks of the river and to purchase or lease boats to
float others down the Missouri. He communicated with Captain Torrey, the Adjutant at
Fort Shaw, and informed him that a guide named Cadotti, employed by the N.W. Fur
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Company (Northwestern Fur Company), had been suggested to him. He later wrote that
Cadotti was not available. The N.W. Fur Co. said it could not release him for the ninety
days anticipated for the work involved in the summer camp. They suggested some other
possible guides whose credentials Andrews said, he was checking on.
By late March, the weather began to turn warmer. The snow was melting away in
the flatlands and only the deepest crevices in the foothills held any trace of winter. The
ice in the river was beginning to crack. It remained a month more before completely
passing by. The month of May would arrive before riverboats again sailed the waters of
the Missouri.
Meanwhile, Colonel Andrews sent a plan to Fort Shaw regarding the summer post
to be located near the Musselshell. In his proposal to Col. Reeve, the District
Commander, Andrews suggested a company of men be dispatched to the area of the
Musselshell River for a period of four-to-six months. While located thusly, over one
hundred miles downriver from Camp Cooke, Andrews would assign soldiers of the
detachment to patrol areas around Cow Island and the mouth of the Musselshell. The
military force would fight against the Indian attacks on riverboats, the local farmers, and
ranchers.
In a written report, regarding the necessary calculations for moving men and
equipment to the summer post, he determined the Army must build a road capable of
allowing the Army to convey goods and drive a herd of cattle that would serve as food
for the detachment posted at the summer camp. The road would need to be suitable for
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handling a six-mule team with wagon. His plan would have the troops start downriver in
late May.
Calculating that a wagon road can be found and that the first boat up will not
arrive earlier than last year, i.e. May 24th to this point or say May 20th to the
Muscleshell, and that the distance from here by land will not exceed 120
miles……63
He wrote that he intended to send the overland soldiers down much sooner.
Perhaps, he suggested, they would leave as soon as the latter part of April. In a
communication on March 23, Col. Andrews wrote about his efforts to obtain a boat for
sending troops down the river to the summer outpost near the mouth of the Musselshell.
He informed Fort Shaw that Fort Benton merchants quoted wide ranges of prices for
hauling men, equipment, and supplies to the Musselshell. While one firm offered to carry
the load for $4.00 per hundred pounds of goods and soldiers, another proposed leasing a
boat for $800.00 for the whole season. Still another company in Fort Benton, Andrews
reported, offered a boat or “Rive” for $10.00 a day. He estimated the Mackinaw boat
would carry 24,000 pounds.
In early April, Colonel Andrews sent information regarding a boat he felt the
Army could purchase for a reasonable price. It measured forty-eight feet long, ten feet
wide and had a depth of two feet, nine inches. A Fort Benton merchant offered to sell it
for $800.00. A few days later, Andrews wrote back with a change of mind. He had
learned the present owner purchased the boat for sale in Fort Benton six months before
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for $400.00. The Camp Cooke commander clearly stated he did not desire to be taken
advantage of, nor should the Army fall for this obvious fraud.
He did suggest to Capt. Torrey at Fort Shaw that Camp Cooke build two boats
instead of buying one. In his reasoning, he stated two facts: it would be cheaper for his
men to construct boats using their own sawmill; and, if soldiers constructed the boats at
Camp Cooke, they could build them to their own specifications. Colonel Andrews
suggested they design the craft after the style of the ferry currently at use at the post.64
Col. Reeve agreed with the plan to build the boats. Camp Cooke’s lumber mill
crew would build two boats. The Army hired Jasper Van Wely and Michael Roney,
discharged soldiers who previously had worked in the saw mill at Camp Cooke, as
civilian workers to build the boats. A patrol of solders brought the timber for the boats
overland from Fort Shaw. The hardwood timber that soldiers cut in the hills around Sun
River would produce a stronger craft than the soft Cottonwood located around Camp
Cooke.
The spring of 1868 arrived late. As the temperatures began to rise, vegetation
along the banks quickly turned green. The new grass brought a welcome relief.
Livestock now grazed on the new foliage. Col. Andrews sent Lieutenant Canfield and a
mounted patrol with the assignment to find a path along the river that could accommodate
a mule-drawn wagon and a small herd of cattle. Lt. Canfield’s party found a possible
overland path, though it might prove to be the difficult. Canfield charted the
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characteristics of the terrain regularly. A day from Camp Cooke, he called the
countryside “…the poorest country I ever saw. Dry alkali soil, more soft and loose than a
newly plowed field and no vegetation but sage and cactus.” 65
In the latter part of April, Major Clinton returned to Camp Cooke. He arrived in
time to see the first of the boats launched. He also was witness to an indication the
Indians were ready to step up their activities, and perhaps show the Army would not
be a deterrent to them. On April 28, a raiding party of Indians, identified as either
Blackfeet or Sioux attacked the herders guarding Camp Cooke’s livestock. After chasing
the herders into hiding in a small “cooley” near Dead Man’s Rapids, they escaped with a
substantial number of the post’s riding stock. Andrews sent out a patrol in pursuit, which
was again unable to catch up with them. In his report, he wrote,
…our losses are (22) twenty-two public horses, (9) mules, (2) private horses.
Strength of the Indians about 50 men all well mounted, they had with them 10
or 12 light-colored horses, besides those from this post.66
Later in the day, travelers brought a civilian woodcutter from Drowned Man’s
Rapids into the post. They believed the same Indians who raided the post had attacked
him earlier that morning. In critical condition, shot eight or nine times with arrows, he
told the soldiers that Blackfeet Indians had attacked him. An Indian scout at the post,
after examining the arrow shafts, felt it more likely they were Sioux though one arrow
resembled those of Crow Indians. The Montana Post gave a description of the incident,
while again belittling the soldiers of Camp Cooke.
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Yesterday the U.S. mail party from Camp Cook (which arrives here semiweekly) brought the sad intelligence of the murder of Nathaniel Crabtree…On
Friday last, while out hunting for his cattle, about one mile from his cabin, he
was attacked by a large party of Blackfeet Indians, and shot six or seven times
with arrows. He was conveyed to Camp Cook and died in the hospital the
same night. He stated himself that the Blackfeet Indians killed him.
While this murder was going on, a portion of the same band of Indians (whom
it seems numbered between 200 and 300) proceeded to Camp Cook (three
miles below) and in full sight of 400 soldiers…proceeded to quietly
appropriate 23 head of government horses and nine head of mules. After
securing these trophies, they proceeded to an adjacent hill and gleefully
proclaimed their great victory. All this was done while still in the range of the
guns of the fort.67
In early May, there was a change of command in which Major William Clinton
reassumed command of Camp Cooke and Lieutenant Colonel Andrews took over
command of Fort Shaw. In The History of the Thirteenth Regiment, United States
Infantry, an unnamed officer is quoted as saying, “Major Clinton did not prove to be a
very capable post builder and very little progress was made until the arrival of Lieutenant
Colonel George L. Andrews.”68 In view of his experience in building Camp Cooke using
military men and no civilian labor, this seemed an unusual statement. However, this
unnamed officer completed his comment by saying that following the arrival of Colonel
Andrews and the subsequent arrival of Colonel I.V.D. Reeve, after naming Fort Shaw the
District Headquarters, work was completed rapidly.
With the beginning of May, Major Robert Nugent and seventy-five men boarded
the boats and began their journey down the Missouri River to arrive two days later at the
summer posting near the mouth of the Musselshell. That same day Major Nugent’s
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contingent arrived at the mouth of the Musselshell, Lieutenant Canfield and twenty-five
men began their cross-country journey driving horses and beef cattle to the summer
campsite. The summer would prove to be a difficult one at the camp on the Musselshell,
given the name Camp Reeve, and at Camp Cooke. Both would face increased hostilities,
leading up to Indian raids and soldier deaths at Camp Reeve and an actual attack on
Camp Cooke.
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CHAPTER SEVEN:
CAMP REEVE ON THE MUSSELSHELL –
CAMP COOKE ATTACKED
At Camp Cooke, Major Clinton watched the departure of Major Nugent’s
company of men on their way to the Musselshell River and worried about the loss of 100
men from his ranks. He feared his depleted numbers would not be able to hold off a
potential Indian attack. Rumors in the area from the miners at Coal Banks, and the
woodcutters along the river, and an increase in exaggerated newspaper reports indicated
more frequent and bolder attacks by the Indian tribes. Clinton even seemed to expect an
assault on Camp Cooke itself.
During this time, Lt. Andrew Canfield led a patrol of twenty-five men, a muledriver, and a translator down the south bank of the Missouri River with a wagon loaded
with supplies and a herd of cattle, bound for the summer camp on the Musselshell.
Left Camp Cooke, M.T. at 8 a.m. with 25 men, 1 guide and interpreter, 12
mules and 3 horses. Passed steamers “Success” and “Cora” at Bird’s Rapids.
Camped at Dophin’s Rapids at 4:30. A pile of the “Success” freight and four
citizens at camp.69
They traveled until four o’clock that evening and camped at Dauphin’s Rapids.
During the trip down river, which took six days, Canfield wrote of the journey in his
journal. On two occasions, mules slipped into the river. Soldiers had to pull them out and
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dry the gear. For several days it rained. It was a difficult trip. One section of the road
required them to carve part of the path with their knives.
May 14, 1868.
Up at daylight. Started at 6. Road the worst I ever traveled over.
May 15, 1868.
It rained all night and all day. Marching along the river bank. 3 Pack mules
fell into the river. Packs all wet. Camped at Cow Island.
May 16, 1868.
Waited for horses until 10 a.m. Rained all night and into noon. Left the river.
Marched on bluffs. Camped one mile below Grand Island at sundown. Men
very tired.
May 17, 1868
Up at daylight. Morning warm and bright. Marched over very steep bluffs.
Rained in P.M. Pack of Hard Bread fell in the river, Mule and all. Had to dig
road with butcher knives in two places. Cattle mired twice. Had to pull them
out 70
The patrol arrived at the Musselshell campsite on May 20.
In order to bolster his numbers at Camp Cooke, Clinton reduced the detachment
guarding Coal Banks Landing by four men. He ordered these men back to Camp Cooke.
He also brought in men from the detachment at The Springs and from the mail party at
Fort Benton. As if to confirm Major Clinton’s concerns, a letter submitted in the Helena
Herald attested to the increased boldness of the Indian population in the Missouri River
area.
The Indians in the coal regions about one hundred fifty miles below Benton
are reported to be unusually belligerent, and have assumed an attitude of
absolute defiance towards the whites. The miners who were engaged in the
coal diggings have been forced to leave and abandon their work altogether.71
Sioux and Crow warriors did attack Camp Cooke in May. The Hollywood
accounts of multitudes of war-painted Indians led by chiefs in feathered bonnets riding
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their blanketed ponies in circles around some stockaded post with corner-mounted
bastions standing on an open plain are all myths. There are almost no accounts of Indians
actually attacking fortified western military posts. This is not to say Indian attacks did
not occur, sometimes in sight of a post. The Hayfield Fight at Fort C.F. Smith and the
Fetterman Massacre near Fort Phil Kearney are examples of battles on the Northern
Plains that took place near these military posts.
Two posts in the Northern Plains could lay claim to Indian attacks. Fort Abercrombie
in the Dakota Territory in 1862 and Camp Cooke in the Montana Territory in 1868.
Abercrombie was less a fort than a collection of buildings. Located on the Red River,
bordering North Dakota and Minnesota, the post consisted of a wooden enlisted barracks,
officer’s quarters, a commissary, a guardhouse, sutler’s store, and stables. It had no stockade
or wall and brush and vegetation on both sides of the Red River gave adequate cover to any
approaching attackers. In August 1862, Captain John Vander Horck wrote to his district
commander that Indians were prowling around the post. In September, Indians, identified as
Sioux surrounded Fort Abercrombie. Estimates were made of four hundred Indians attacking
the post from three sides. After several hours, the Sioux warriors retreated, taking a large
number of horses and most of the fort’s cattle. Indians harassed the post for almost a month,
but the first day’s battle was the only major confrontation.
On May 17, 1868, however, the myth became reality. It must have been a startling
sight to see the hills surrounding Camp Cooke covered with hundreds of Indians in war paint
looking down on the post. With his command recently diminished by one hundred soldiers
sent to the summer outpost at the Musselshell, Major Clinton found himself greatly
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concerned with the ominous situation. Indians had attacked the area surrounding Camp
Cooke and made raids on the post’s livestock for months. Seeing they were obviously
outnumbered and hoping to find some way to negotiate with the Indians, Clinton and his men
approached the warriors with hands raised in signs of peace. They were met instead with a
“volley of arrows” and were forced to make a quick retreat back to the camp, arriving inside
just before the Indians began an assault on the post.
As the attack was about to begin, First Lieutenant William Auman galloped out of the
camp with a mule driver to where the post’s livestock grazed about a quarter mile away and
helped the herdsmen drive the horses and some cattle into the parade grounds. Once back
inside the camp, he ran to a cannon and began cutting fuses in preparation for firing the sixpound gun. It was while cutting these fuses, with his rifle, slung over his shoulder, that the
carbine discharged firing a bullet into his instep. Soldiers carried Lieutenant Auman to the
post hospital, where the regimental surgeon operated, removing the projectile and saving his
foot. The incident is briefly listed on Auman’s record, on file with the Arlington National
Cemetery; the official record did not mention that it was an “accidental discharge of a
carbine in his own hands” as the report sent by Major Clinton would state.
May 17, 1868: Captain Wm Auman (then a 1st lieutenant) in addition to being
in command of B Company was the post quartermaster, and when the Indians
appeared his first thought was to secure the government animals which were
grazing a quarter of a mile from the post.
Armed with a rifle he proceeded to the corral, mounted a horse, and
accompanied by one of the teamsters road out and secured the animals while
the hostile Indians were within two hundred yards of the herd.
After the animals had been put in the corral he went where one of the field
pieces had opened fire, and finding that the piece was loaded with shell the
fuse of which was uncut, he cut one fuse with his pocket knife and started for
the magazine for a fuse knife. At this juncture he received a bullet wound in
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the left foot, the ball passing through the instep and causing a most painful and
serious wound.72

Figure 15. William Auman as Capt in 1880s.
(Picture from book; Officers of the Army and Navy, Regular, Who
Served in the Civil War. Powell, William H. Philadelphia, Pa.
Hamersly Publishing 1892)
The combined Sioux – Crow attack lasted five hours, ending at approximately 8
P.M. in the evening. At one point, hysteria set in among the women and they began to
panic, believing the post might actually fall. They pleaded with the officers that should
the Indians capture the post, they would not allow them to be taken alive. Sarah Canfield
wrote:
When we ladies saw what might happen we held a “council of war” and
decided if the Ft. could not be held that we preferred to be shot by our own
officers rather than to be taken captive. The officers promised to do so before
surrendering. Dr. Porter was to see to Mrs. A[uman] who is soon to become a
mother. Capt. DeCourcy took me, Lieut. A[uman] Mrs. N[ugent], Maj.
C[linton] Mrs. H[orrigan] but while it would have been done if necessary, we
are spared to tell about the attack of the Ft. by three thousand Indians73
When speaking of the attack later, Lieutenant Auman said that soldiers had
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barricaded the women inside the powder storeroom and determined if the post could not
be held they would torch it. The resulting explosion would kill the women and deprive
the “savages” of access to both the women’s bodies or any remaining gunpowder and
weapons the camp might still possess.
Four days later, Major Clinton sent a letter to Fort Shaw reporting on the Indian
attack. He could make no estimate of the number of the enemy that attacked the post,
though numbers varied from a few hundred up to as many as twenty-five hundred
Indians. He was also unable to determine the number of Indian casualties. Sarah
Canfield wrote in her journal that the Indians “were all tied to their horses and taken
away at the end of the battle.”
Major Clinton’s letter gave no indication that there was any fear of the Indians
overtaking the post as Sarah Canfield’s journal described. His matter-of-fact report was
without many details and only said the post had been attacked. Major Clinton’s comment
in the letter is interesting in that he calls the Indian fight “the boldest attack I ever saw
made by Indians.” Given that Indian attacks on military posts were extremely rare, one
might wonder just how many attacks Clinton had seen in his career.
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Figure 16. Copy of letter sent by Major William Clinton detailing May 1868
Indian attack on Camp Cooke (from microfilm obtained through
National Archives Washington, D.C.)
The very differences between the stories told by Mrs. Canfield and Lieutenant
Auman, and the report by Major Clinton and the articles in the newspaper illustrate one
of the difficulties in recording history. A Helena newspaper reported the Indians
assaulted the post in three separate waves of charges. According to the Helena Herald,
estimates of the number of braves ranged as high as twenty-five hundred. In the article it
reported, “The battle lasted until sometime near 8:00 in the evening and under the cover
of darkness, the attackers removed their injured and dead making a count impossible.”74
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The newspaper’s source of information within the post was unknown. Although the only
recorded military injury at Camp Cooke during the Indian attack was a self-inflicted
gunshot wound, and the number of Indians killed or wounded could not be determined,
the soldiers of Camp Cooke never again presumed their security and safety.
Following this attack on Camp Cooke, Sarah Canfield’s thoughts turned to her
husband who was in the summer detachment at Camp Reeve. Plans called for Camp
Reeve to be in place until well into September, perhaps to coincide with the end of the
season for the steamboats traveling along the Missouri River. Rather than spend the next
several months at Camp Cooke without her husband, Sarah made the decision to return to
her home in Iowa.
Soldiers at Camp Reeve also had a difficult time in May and Sarah’s concerns for
her husband and those soldiers were real. The commander of Camp Reeve sent a letter to
Major Clinton on May 21, detailing an Indian attack the outpost had experienced the day
before. Captain Nugent provided detail in his reports:
I have the honor to report that yesterday morning at 8:30 a.m. a party of about
75 Sioux Indians was discovered about one mile from the post, where they
divided, one party making directly for my camp, and coming within 200
yards, and the other attacked some new “citizens”…another party were
discovered in the point about 500 yards below the camp, moving off 3
mules…I immediately put Lieut. Edwards with 15 men to head them off, and
if possible to recapture the mules which he succeeded in doing. There were
none of my men or any of the citizens injured, and I think I am safe in saying
that quite a number of Indians were wounded but as they were fastened to
their horses, it was impossible to say whether any were killed, on this first
appearance of the Indians, I had the men assembled under arms.75
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On May 24, Indians attacked the detachment’s herd at Camp Reeve at about noon.
The animals had been grazing a half mile from the camp. The Indian archers, believed to
be Sioux, killed a private named Quesnelle who had been guarding the herd. The soldiers
found tracks on the ground leading to the bank of the Musselshell River. It was presumed
that James Cook, another private guarding the livestock, had either been killed and
thrown into the Musselshell River, or had drowned as he attempted to hide. Searchers
never found his body. Again, Captain Nugent sent a report to Camp Cooke.
In his report, Captain Nugent informed Major Clinton that Sioux and Crow
Indians had attacked the herders of their beef cattle, shooting a Private Constaul
Quesnelle seven times with arrows, killing him. Another private, Cooke, was missing
and indications on the ground were that the Indian had killed him and then dragged and
thrown his body into the river. Lieutenant Edwards and seventeen men had managed to
save the cattle from theft, but they were unable to chase the Indians due to an insufficient
supply of horses.76
Sarah Canfield had made the decision to return to her home in Iowa. Mrs. Auman
and the other women made appeals to Sarah to stay with them at Camp Cooke. She wrote
that her mind was determined and she was prepared to leave the post and return to the
states. Sarah wrote in her journal that she might be willing to return if her husband
remained in the Army.
I have packed our household goods and left them in our rooms and shall go
to Iowa very soon. We have not seen any Indians but eternal vigilance
seems to be the price of safety, but it is hard on the nerves. Yet, I shall
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come back next Spring if Mr. C(anfield) does not resign.77
Sarah Canfield wrote that, as she left Camp Cooke, she looked forward to seeing her
husband. She also noted that Colonel I.V.D. Reeve was on the boat with her and was
also heading back to the States.
Today I said goodbye to my friends I am leaving. The boat will reach the
Muscle shell (Camp Reeve) tomorrow. The camp is named for our Col. A
fine old man. I think I am fortunate to travel on the same boat as him. He is
going home on “leave”78

Figure 17. The “Far West” – typical Riverboat sailing the Missouri River in
the 1860s (Haynes Foundation Collection, Montana Historical
Society Helena, Montana)
The major purpose of Camp Reeve had been to attempt to control the Indian attacks
around Cow Island and the mouth of the Musselshell River, and further down the Missouri
River. No records remain to show how successful this assignment was, with the exception of
the letters regarding the attacks Indians carried out on the outpost.
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Captain Nugent also took it upon himself to become involved with enforcing the
law against the illegal sales of alcohol to Indians. On May 24, the familiar figure of
George Clendenin arrived at Camp Reeve aboard the Riverboat “Atkins.” Clendenin had
been a post sutler at Camp Cooke. He disembarked from the boat with a large supply of
whiskey, which he made no attempts to deny he had plans to sell to the Indians. After
vigorous questioning, Nugent ordered Clendenin to load his stock of alcohol on the next
boat and take it and himself out of the territory. However, before doing so, he apparently,
and in what would appear to be in direct violation of standing orders at Camp Cooke,
sold some of his stock to the soldiers at Camp Reeve. It apparently caused a great deal of
excitement that night as several soldiers became highly intoxicated and their actions were
quite “unprofessional.” The next boat, the “Success,” had Colonel Reeve and Mrs.
Canfield on it. Lieutenant Canfield wrote in his journal:
The Little Scotchman ordered to shut up his store for disobeying orders.
Steamer “Success” came down with Mrs. Canfield, Col. Reeve and the Pay
Master. … Men got whiskey and had a loud time. Guard got scared in the
night and alarmed the camp by firing in the air. 79
Sarah Canfield enjoyed a final evening with her husband before her return home.
She and Andrew spent time together at Camp Reeve. She wrote of the burials of the two
soldiers killed earlier that day, though all records indicate only one body was actually
buried. She wrote briefly of her last day in Montana with her husband.
The commander excused Mr. C(anfield) from duty that he might visit with me
but his sword and pistols are on the table and he may be called any minute as
they are in a very hostile section of the Indian country. We left the camp at
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Sundown. It was a sad parting. The life at such a camp is So dangerous. I
wanted to Stay but I could not, and it will be so long before I get a letter. 80
The increased activity by the Indians had made life in the Montana Territory more
dangerous. Soldiers at Camp Cooke and those at the outpost at Camp Reeve still felt
alone with no regular communications. Sarah Canfield could no longer live without the
protection of her husband, and as she left, she could not help but wonder at what
protection he could hope for in the future.
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CHAPTER EIGHT:
MEN OF CAMP REEVE RETURN – DAILY LIFE AND DEATH
The summer deployment at Camp Reeve was plagued by Indian encounters, both
on the river and around their camp, as well as by whiskey peddlers who attempted to
sneak into the territory and sell illegal alcohol to the Indians. Among the surviving
reports and letters from Camp Reeve are three cover letters for monthly returns from
Company E of the Thirteenth Infantry during the summer months of 1868. Captain
Nugent addressed these letters to Camp Cooke, sending them as part of the required
reports on the status of soldiers and equipment of the summer detail while on detached
duty. No actual reports remain.

Figure 18. Copy of letter accompanying Monthly Report of Returns from
Camp Reeve at mouth of Musselshell River, August 1868.
(Microfilm obtained through National Archives Washington, D.C.)

86

With a major contingent of his regiment on summer deployment at Camp Reeve,
Major Clinton continued to express concern about the number of soldiers remaining on
active duty at the post. To complicate further this situation, in late May, Major Clinton
received orders that required him to send more men as an escort detail to accompany
Private William Barry of Company E, Thirteenth Infantry, to Fort Buford to stand trial
for murder. Documents from Fort Buford accused Barry of killing a British soldier. The
previous June, Captain W. D. Spears of the 79th Royal Rifles had been traveling upriver
on the Octavia to Fort Benton, while Barry was on his way to Camp Cooke on the same
riverboat. The warrant charged Barry with shooting the British officer in the back of the
head as Spears was climbing the stairs heading to his room for the night.
Private Barry remained under confinement at Camp Cooke for eleven months.
There seemed to be a dispute that since the crime happened on the river in the Dakota
Territory, Major Clinton felt he had no authority to try Barry in the Montana Territory.
Following the orders to send Barry for trial, Major Clinton assigned a party, consisting of
Sergeant Jacob Carrolis and three privates of Company H, to escort Barry downriver
aboard the steamboat Pecuniah to Fort Buford where he would face a Regimental Court
Martial. The trial was held in the latter part of 1868 and, after contradictory testimony
and a lack of available witnesses, the officers of the board found Barry not guilty.81 The
soldiers who accompanied Barry were unable to return to Camp Cooke until the
following spring.
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Back in Montana, in late May, with reports showing Camp Cooke under strength
at less than fifty enlisted men, Major Clinton wrote to Fort Shaw asking permission to
pull soldiers from Coal Banks Landing and return them to Camp Cooke to bolster the
number of troops at the post. Lt. Col. Andrews, as acting commander of the District of
Montana, refused the request. As a result, on May 30, 1868, Major Clinton wrote Special
Orders 53 and directed Sergeant H. Warton and ten privates of Company H to duty at
Coal Banks Landing. Sgt. Warton led his patrol from Camp Cooke to Coal Banks on
June 1.82
Major Clinton expressed further displeasure in June. He wrote to Fort Shaw and
informed them that Camp Cooke’s isolation had become even more severe. The posts’
only connection with the western side of the river was the ferry the post used for
transporting troops, cargo, and mail across the Missouri. Due to breakage of one of the
ropes that operated the ferry, its use was no longer possible. Clinton had reported that
finding a replacement rope of sufficient length was proving difficult. He asked
permission to buy a small boat, a yawl, from one of the steamships in order to transport
soldiers across the Missouri until they could repair the ferry. It was early August before
the ferry was back in full operation.
The troop strength at Camp Cooke was again under consideration when Major
Clinton wrote a letter concerned with the coming winter and how unprepared he felt the
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post was with the small number of soldiers currently available for the work that needed to
be done.
….should Col. Nugent carry out his idea and not arrive here until the 1st of
November, it will be very detrimental to the command as we have not a stick
of wood cut for winter, and with our present force cannot cut any, we have
this morning 43 men for duty 18 go on guard and 18 come off leaving 7 men
for the ordinary work of the garrison the old guard go to work at noon and we
are far behind in our work. 83
Despite the reduced size of the complement at Camp Cooke, Major Clinton was
known for a sometimes ruthless dedication to duty and he did attempt to keep up routine.
He posted the summer schedule that gave an hour-by-hour account of the soldier’s day at
the post. The enlisted men at Camp Cooke put in a full day. The schedule was listed in
the Surgeon’s Report, dated September 1868.
Calls
Drumers (sic) Call
Reveille
Police Call
Stable do
Recall from Stable
Breakfast Call
Fatigue
Sick
do
Water
do
Guard Mount 1st do
Guard Mount
Drill Call
Recall from Drill
do do fatigue
Water Call
Orderly do
Dinner do
Fatigue do
83

4.30 A.M.
4.45 “
5.
“
5.10 “
5.55 “
6.
6.30
7.
7.30
8.50
9.

“
“
“
“
“
“
10.
11.

“
“

11.30 “
11.35 “
11.45 “
12
M
1. P.M.

Major William Clinton to Fort Shaw, Letter, August 29, 1868. Letters Sent 8/186612/1869, Camp Cooke, Montana Territory, Group 393, ARC Identifier 656994, MLR #A1-5 92-1,
National Archives, Washington, D.C.
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Drill do
Recall from drill
Stable Call
Recall from Fatigue
do do Stable
Retreat
Tattoo
Taps
Sunday Morning Insp.
Guard Mount Immediately thereafter
Dress Parade 1st Call
Dress Parade
Retreat 84

3.30
4.30
5.30
6.
6.15
7
9
9.15
8.

“
“
“
“
“

“
“
“
am
6.30 pm

In his medical log, post surgeon, Captain N.B. Campbell, also gave his report on the
physical description of the post:
The Post Bakery is a frame building almost covered with tin to keep out the
rats, otherwise in good condition.
The bedding of the hospital is of good quality and more than enough in
quantity. The iron cots are dilapidated but few being in good order. That of
the men consists of the regulation bed – sacks filled with straw, and their
regular Army blankets, the bunks are 2 ft height, 6 feet long & four ft wide of
unplanned cottonwood boards, in otherwise fair condition.
The clothing of the men is not of the best quality in all respects, and some of it
is made of shoddy. The character and condition of some of it however is good
and the supply is very large.
The Company Store rooms have dirt floors and roofs & are enclosed with one
thickness of inch boards battened & are terribly infested with innumberable
rats.
Fatigue duty occupies nearly all the men in cutting and hauling wood for the
Post, drawing water, caring for the horses and policing.
Almost every article of food is boiled and badly served. Supply of Food is
ample.
The garrison at present is 38 because of the terms of service of so many
having expired and recruits not have yet arrived.
The kitchens are poor but correspond with the rest of the camp. Are framed
over adobe with earth roofs and have ranges for cooking.85
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In August, the Army delivered ninety-eight horses to Camp Cooke from Fort
Shaw. Fort Shaw orders instructed Major Clinton to load the horses on riverboats for
transport downriver to Fort Buford, located in the Dakota Territory. However, by the
time of their arrival, the river traffic had closed. Major Clinton wrote to Col. Andrews
that there was no way to move the horses to Fort Buford by water. He also expressed
great concern on how his small contingent of soldiers could keep them secure and
questioned how they would manage to feed them until they could be moved. In
September, the situation compounded when a local citizen, James Huffel, brought three
hundred and fifty more horses that he claimed to have orders to sell to the Army at Forts
Shaw and Ellis. There is no record in letters or orders of the eventual disposition of the
horses. An entry in the Post Surgeon’s journal does say that later in the fall, two hundred
of the horses remained in the camp. “They are kept in the parade Ground for security and
greatly deface it.”86
At Camp Reeve, Captain Nugent made the decision at the end of August to take
down the temporary post on the Musselshell and return to Camp Cooke. During that time,
in his journal, Lt. Andrew Canfield wrote of noticeable changes in the weather. On
September 1, Canfield wrote in his journal, “Very cool with rain. Preparing to break
camp.”87 Company E spent four days “breaking camp” and loading their boats. They set
out for Camp Cooke at 6:30 in the morning on September 5. The journey up river would
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be difficult. The boats would be fighting a current that ran at a steady five miles an hour.
Most days the wind was blowing hard into their faces.
On September 12, they awoke to a thin layer of ice in their pots and along the
shore of the river. The evening’s rain turned to snow around midnight. The snow fell
intermittently for several days. Due to this unseasonable and difficult weather, on
September 14, the company remained in a makeshift camp all day, drying their clothes
and bedding. The day was sunny, but as evening came, the sky clouded over and snow
began again. Traveling against the Missouri’s current remained a difficult task. After
one morning’s efforts, they had progressed less than three miles up stream. On
September 20, Canfield reported they were nearing the end.
Up and started early. All safely across Dofans Rapids at 9:10. Made a good
day’s march and camped about eight miles from Cooke. Very pleasant.
The next two days were not as pleasant and progress was difficult.
September 21, 1868.
Cold and Rainy. Started early. Worked hard all day and moved about three
miles. Crossed the river and camped opposite Tabor’s Island. Went over to
the Island for supper.
September 22, 1868.
Up and started early, Cold and cloudy and wind blowing great guns. Had
much trouble. Could not move against the wind. Stoped and unloaded at
2.P.M. about 1 ½ miles from Cooke and moved up in wagons. Wet all day.
Took dinner with Major Clinton. Moved into my old quarters and passed the
most lonely night I ever experienced. My application for leave of absence
came back disapproved.88
It had taken the members of Company H two days to reach the Musselshell by river. Lt.
Canfield took six days overland. The return trip upriver to Camp Cooke took eighteen
days.
88
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Following the arrival of Company E back at Camp Cooke, and the required
reporting to Major Clinton, Lieutenant Canfield was assigned duty as commander of the
mounted detachment of the post. He had only been back a week when the Major called
upon him to lead a patrol in pursuit of a band of Indians who had stolen packhorses and
supplies from a party bound for Fort Buford. According to Alfred Parker, the sergeant in
charge, one hundred Indians had attacked his party near Beaver Creek, pursuing them and
exchanging shots as they attempted to find suitable ground for cover and defense.
Lieutenant Canfield reported to Major Clinton that he could not lead a satisfactory patrol
as only seven of the twenty-eight available horses could be saddled. The others “kick,
paw, and bite whoever attempts to go near them.”89 It had become a common complaint
that the Thirteenth Infantry could not mount enough horses to engage the Indians
effectively. This only provided more material for the newspapers in their attacks on
Camp Cooke and its increasing lack of usefulness.
The hardship of frontier military life was further demonstrated in the fall with the
report of three deaths in rapid succession. One of these deaths occurred in October and
the other two in November. Sergeant W.F Reid, who had been court martialed in 1866
for refusing to give up his tent to an officer, had worked his way back up to sergeant.
Reid was reported, in a letter by Major Clinton, to have drowned in the Missouri River
while on leave. The distinction of “died on leave” as opposed to “in the line of duty” was
a major one for Sergeant Reid’s family. The family of a soldier who died “in the line of
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duty” was entitled to public transportation back to their “home of record.” The family of
a soldier who died while on leave was not given those benefits. In addition, upon the
soldier’s death, all housing allowances were discontinued. These rules pertained to all
military, officers, and enlisted in the 1800s.
The two other deaths occurred within a week of each other. Private Jacob Lones
died from what an autopsy described as a ruptured kidney after a horse fell on him and
the saddle pummel struck him in the stomach. Private James Loohen died from what
investigation determined to be an accidental gunshot wound fired by another soldier from
a distance of one or two feet. The doctor’s medical log reported the incident with Private
Loohen.
Pvt. James Loohen Co “E” 13th Infantry died at 4.14 am this morning. Pvt.
Loohen was brought to the hospital on Thursday morning last in a condition
of collapse, from a wound through his thigh caused by the accidental
discharge of a Spencer carbine at the distance of one or two feet from him, the
ball shattering the bone. In spite of all our efforts, the patient never rallied.
Three times during the night of Thursday his heart ceased for a time to beat
and was believed to be dead, notwithstanding he however lingered twentyfour hours longer and died at 4.14 this morning without re-action from the
shock.90
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Figure 19. Death certificate and notice of burial for Private James Loohan.
(Microfilm obtained through National Archives Washington, D.C)
Private Lones was ill for several days before reporting to sick call. The doctor
determined Uremic Poisoning from the ruptured kidney was the ultimate cause of death.

Figure 20. Order of burial for Private James Lones (Microfilm obtained
Through National Archives Washington, D.C.)
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Both men were buried in the Camp Cooke Cemetery.
In addition to the duties in seeing to the sick and dying, the post doctor
demonstrated a part of his duties covered caring for the healthy. Near the end of the year,
he sent a letter to the Council of Administration urging a change in the diets of the
soldiers. An example of how difficult life could be at a frontier post is in his letter when
he wrote of men served bacon “many years old”:
I respectfully suggest to you the propriety of increasing the size of the loaf of
bread daily issued as a ration to the soldiers. It weighs, when first taken from
the oven 18 ounces, & 16 ounces when one day old. The men continually
complain of being hungry. They have to work when not on guard duty &
require full feeding. They receive beef but three days a week & bacon the
remaining four days. This bacon is many years old, rancid & disagreeable to
the taste & the men would rather go hungry than eat it. I have been informed
that a man will frequently eat his whole ration of bread at one meal and either
go hungry the other two or buy an entire loaf from the baker. The ration (18
oz of flour) ought to make nearly 36 oz of bread, unless I am wrongly
informed, so that the men now get but half their ration of flour. 91
This dietary indication of the soldier’s life at Camp Cooke was a prime example
of the disagreeable nature of the situation at Camp Cooke. While fresh fruits and
vegetables were not always available at the mess tables, posts located nearer to civilized
areas were able to obtain commodities from the local economy. As he wrote in his
article, “Frontier Critics of the Western Army,” Robert G. Althern explained how western
towns fought to get military posts located near them because of the trade that benefitted
the local merchants. In his article in Montana, the Magazine of Western History, he
pointedly mentioned the anger and disgust voiced by the merchants in Fort Benton when
the first post in Montana was not built in their town, but put on the Judith River.
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CHAPTER NINE:
THE END COMES – RATS AND CAMP COOKE CLOSES
By 1869, Camp Cooke had already lost much of its importance within the
Montana Territory. Only three greatly reduced companies remained at Camp Cooke.
Fort Shaw assumed responsibility for most of the patrols that were originally undertaken
by the soldiers of Cooke. Boredom from the imposed isolation of a post located over one
hundred miles from the nearest town became more intense.
One of the few assignments Camp Cooke still controlled was the responsibility
for mail carriers to Fort Benton. On January 4, 1869, Major Clinton appointed Captain
Robert Nugent to lead a mail patrol from Camp Cooke to Fort Benton. Upon arriving at
Fort Benton, Nugent relieved the soldiers currently assigned there. The depleted
command of Camp Cooke could be noted in Clinton’s orders. To accompany Captain
(referred to in the orders as Brevet Colonel) Nugent was Sergeant John B. Farrell of “C”
Company and ten privates. Clinton ordered the privates divided between the three
remaining companies, with three coming from “C” Company, four from “E” Company,
and three from “H” Company. This division between the units to staff a patrol was a new
development carried out because of the greatly understaffed companies remaining at
Camp Cooke and the inability to fully staff a patrol using the resources of one unit.92
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With the greatly reduced numbers of soldiers at Camp Cooke, the stores of
supplies and rations were in excess of what the post would need. Special Orders No 12,
dated February 23, 1869, gave instructions for disposing of these unneeded supplies.
Following these instructions, issued by Head of Commissary, Department of Dakota,
Major Clinton prepared to sell, in the local towns, as much pork, ham, flour, hard bread,
corn meal, hominy, beans, and rice as he considered surplus to the needs of the post and
excess to what the command would use prior to August 31, 1869. He was, however, to
sell it at a profit and not to sell at a lower price than that of similar items in the stores at
Fort Benton.93 An article in the Helena Daily Herald reported the Army sold goods in
Fort Benton on April third. It also announced the Army would later sell more in Helena.
On the third inst. The Diamond “R” train arrived from Camp Cook, loaded
with surplus stores ordered sold by a Board of Survey. On the 4th they sold
the portion ordered sold at this point to different buyers. The articles thus
disposed by Uncle Sam were bacon, hard bread and flour. The train started
last evening for Helena where the rest will be sold. 94
Those soldiers still at Camp Cooke, with their greatly reduced numbers, found
their fear and concern of the Indians continued to be troubling their minds. Further unrest
and nervousness at Camp Cooke was created with the presence of an Indian camp within
sight of the post. The Surgeon’s report reveals that Indians camped on the opposite side
of the Judith River in February 1869, and at one point the Indians were close enough to
the post that an unknown member of their party stole the camp’s thermometer.
February 14: Twenty-five Crow Indians arrived at Post.
February 16: Thirty-one Crow Indians arrived and twenty-five left post.
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February 18: 104 Lodges of Crow Indians arrived and encamped on east
bank of the Judith River.
February 19: Minimum Thermometer stolen by Indians.95
Newspaper articles continued to be published regarding Indian raids and attacks.
General Hancock’s statement in a report to the War Department, after his visit through
the territory, that most of the Indians were peaceable was, without doubt little comfort to
soldiers who had fought these Indians outside their own post, in May, just a few months
before. Soldiers would have, no doubt preferred to have moved the Indians on, but since
they were on the other side of the Judith and off the post’s reservation, they had no
authority.
Communications and orders for the year 1869 are almost nonexistent. Most
letters consisted of the standard reports that every post sent out at the start of each month.
One of the few communications sent to Fort Shaw in March informed them more
uniforms and equipment had been condemned due to damage caused by the rat
infestation at the post.
The rat infestation at Camp Cooke brought up another aspect of camp life soldiers
and their families had to deal with in the west. A wide variety of vermin infected posts in the
vast lands between the Canadian and the Mexican borders. In Arizona, the legs of beds and
chairs were often put in water or oil to prevent ants, spiders or scorpions from climbing up
them. One Army wife wrote back to her mother that she threw the bed covers back at night
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to ensure a rattlesnake had not crawled under the blankets during the day looking for a cool
place to rest.
At Camp Cooke, other than the oppressive isolation and the fear of Indians, the
problem faced was rats. These pests had probably been brought into the post aboard the
steamboats that docked and unloaded cargo and passengers. They soon became a serious
issue and widespread curse on the camp. An article, printed in the April 3, 1869, issue of the
Helena Daily Herald, partly tongue-in-cheek, but clearly relating an immediate concern,
broadcasted the rat problem to readers across the territory. This further added to the negative
image of Camp Cooke, and at the time it was published may have aided in sealing Camp
Cooke’s fate.
VERMIN OF THE BADLANDS
RAVENOUS RIVER RATS RAIDING RUINOUSLY
UPON CAMP COOK
A RUINED FORT

As startling as the announcement may be, we are nevertheless assured by
officers and gentlemen high in command and of undoubted veracity that the
occupation of Fort or Camp Cook as a military post is rendered absolutely
impossible by the countless hosts of ruinous river rats that besiege the garrison
with a full destructiveness and pertinacity unheard of in rodential history.
We never yet learned who was responsible for the unpardonable blunder of
establishing a post at that miserable, outlandish, isolated, bleak, sterile and
worse than useless spot; ….The story is by no means fiction. What officers,
soldiers, citizens and petitions have failed to accomplish – the removal and
abandonment of Camp Cook – was effectively secured by and thru the
Providential occurrence of an overwhelming and unprecedented rat siege.
During the past year these wharf or river rats have by gathering about there in
such unheard of numbers so undermined the region as to render the entire
camp a dangerous pitfall, a wreck careened and tottering buildings, depleted
the commissary, penetrating the storehouses from underneath and carrying off
provisions by the ton, robbed the Q.M. buildings of blankets, clothing and the
endless variety of articles impoverished and ruined their cavalry horses by
stealing their forage; and in many other acts of riotousness have, thanks to this
vermin actually rendered this post untenable.
On one occasion, the Assistant Commissary found on his return from a brief
absence, that his private quarters were infested by no less than 21 of these
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huge long-tailed varmints, and although he killed the last one of them before
they could escape, they had carried off his bedding, ruined his wardrobe
feasted on his toilet and killed and eaten his pet female terrier and three young
pups! The experience of that awe-struck and rat-bitten garrison has been
extreme indeed, but it has borne its good fruits at last. It is altogether
probable that Uncle Samuel will build no more forts in the “Bad Lands”.96
In April and May, Clinton reported the loss of four hundred pounds of brown
sugar and three thousand pounds of flour, all attributed to rats.
In Montana, the riverboats had not yet begun steaming up and down the Missouri
River in April and discharged soldiers found themselves once again forced to remain in
the post after the end of their enlistments. As he had done in 1867, Major Clinton warned
those newly released individuals of their responsibilities, under Articles of War 60 while
in the camp.
As a good many of the men of this Command are being discharged from the
service of the United States without the means of reaching their homes at
present and in consequence will be obliged to remain at the Post until the
arrival of Steamboats, the Commanding Officer feels it his duty to call their
attention to Art. 60 Articles of War, which article will be strictly
enforced.97
The ex-soldiers were again trapped in the Badlands of Montana with no chance to
return to their homes. The solitary feelings of being unable to escape from Camp Cooke
and yet, even so, these men were prevented from “drowning their sorrow in drink” due to
the extreme control on alcohol at the post. This, again, shows a difference from most
camps and forts in the west. While not necessarily to be envied, there was a freedom of
drinking at most posts and it was acknowledged about seven per cent of the soldiers in
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the army were recognized alcoholics. That number was expected to be higher in the
west.
The tenure of command for Major William Clinton ended in May 1869. This may
have been a result of an act of Congress in March 1869 that resulted in a reorganization
of the Army. In this legislation, companies in the Army were regrouped into twenty-five
regiments, consisting of a total of one hundred twenty-three men and officers each.
Seven hundred and sixty-four officers, covering all ranks, were ordered retired.98 After
receiving orders to relinquish his command, Clinton boarded a riverboat and headed
down the Missouri River, leaving the Montana Territory. Designated for retirement,
Clinton would go on to become a Commissioner of Indian Affairs in the New Mexico
Territory. On May 22, 1869, Captain N.W. Osborne took command of Camp Cooke.
Osborne had little to do as commander of Camp Cooke as the size of the force there
was gradually diminished. Camp Cooke’s end began in early July 1869. Major General
Winfield Scott Hancock and a select team went on an inspection tour of units throughout the
Dakota Department. Arriving at Camp Cooke on July 5, Hancock led a team composed of
Brevet Brigadier General S.B. Holabird (Chief, Quartermaster Department), Surgeon General
E. Summers (Medical Director of the Department), Brevet Major General Samuel A. Baird
(Inspector General of the Department), Brigadier General O.D. Green (Assistant Adjutant
General), Lieutenant Colonel J.H. Gilman (Chief of Commissary and Subsistence), Captain
J.S. Wharton (A.D.C.), and Lieutenant E.H. Totten (Signal Officer).
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After a general inspection of the troops and the post, each officer inspected his
particular area of responsibility. The Post Surgeon’s medical report indicated that Surgeon
General Summers felt the hospital operated efficiently and had the required supply of
appropriate medicines, but felt that if Camp Cooke remained a viable post, the Army should
rebuild the hospital buildings. Others opinions were not as kind and some felt Camp Cooke
had outlived any usefulness it had to the military.
In the 1869 Report to The Secretary of War, being part of the Message and
Documents communicated to the Two Houses of Congress at the Beginning of the Second
Session of the Forty-First Congress, Major General Hancock issued his report on the Dakota
Territory. In the report, he discussed the forts in the territory and his inspection of each one.
He brought up Camp Cooke and proposed its fate.
Having received the proper sanction, I shall cause the abandonment of Camp
Cooke in the spring, and would suggest the site and buildings be transferred to
the Indian Department for the purpose of a reservation for the Indians, should
one be needed in that section of country; and if the proposition be favorably
considered, prompt action be taken before the buildings are torn down and
sold, as is now contemplated.99
Two articles in the Helena Daily Herald referred to General Hancock’s visit to
Fort Benton in July and a promise that a military presence would soon be coming to that
city.
As we stated on the 14th, the citizens of Fort Benton have been successful in
their immediate vicinity. The history of their labors to this end date back to
about three years ago, when Camp Cooke was unwisely established and Col.
Reeve came up the river with a detachment of troops originally intended to
garrison Fort Benton and located them at Cooke….When Gen Hancock was in
99
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Benton a few days hence, the citizens presented a petition to him in which
they set forth in such true and plain terms the absolute necessity of
establishing a garrison at that point, that the General was immediately made
aware of their true situation and the importance of their request.100
Included in General Hancock’s report to the War Department, a chart of troop
strength showed that Captain Osborne now commanded just one company at Camp
Cooke. In a letter to Fort Shaw, Osborne expressed great concern about the security of
the post. Daily returns for Camp Cooke in September 1869 listed thirty-seven men on
active duty. These thirty-seven lived in a post that had been built just three years before
to house nearly eight hundred.
A letter published in the Helena Daily Herald in September and dated August 15,
1869, from Camp Cooke told a story that would have led one to believe there would be
no regrets by any person involved to leave the post on the banks of the Judith River.
As it is very probable that this important (!) post will shortly be abandoned,
and the troops moved to Benton, or the Muscleshell, a few words regarding it
may not be amiss. The post was located at the mouth of the Judith River, in
July, 1866, a little over three years ago…The largest “bluff” of all was by the
Government when it located this post in such an out of the way place, and
tried to make sensible people believe that it was for the protection of the
people of Montana, instead of the soldiers…The great feature of Camp Cooke
is RATS, and I sat down to write about rats, but had almost forgotten it. They
have possession of everything and everyplace of importance about the Fort,
the whole site of which has been undermined by them and resembles a great
honeycomb. ..The officers’ and men’s’ quarters are full of rats of all ages,
kinds, sizes and shapes…gradually but surely have they crowded the troops
into the smallest possible space, and are becoming very insolent and
overbearing towards the whites and they will be satisfied with nothing less
than the immediate evacuation of the post…The troops have acted on the
offensive, and I have it from good authority that in a late raid against these
rats, 1400 were killed in a four days’ engagement; also, that shortly
afterwards, a lonely sentinel was bodily carried away by then\m and has not
been seen since. He was doubtless assassinated and “chawed up” by the
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friends and relatives of those slain by the troops…In view of this, I make bold
to suggest that the Government make this a “reservation for rats,” give it to
them and hold out inducements for rats of every persuasion to settle here…101
By October, orders began to show a steady and inevitable movement of men and
equipment from Camp Cooke to Fort Benton. Special Orders 48, dated October 12,
1869, redirected new recruits assigned to Company “B” to Fort Benton. Lieutenant W.L.
Auman, assigned to Fort Benton, returned to Camp Cooke with twenty-five men of “G”
Company, 13th Infantry. By November 1, the detachment at Camp Cooke was down to a
handful of men and Lieutenant William Auman, the man who had accidentally shot
himself in the foot during the Indian attack in 1868, now had his first command.
Lieutenant Auman submitted a letter to Fort Shaw detailing the progress in dismantling
the post.
The Block House is still up and & three days work will finish it. Five sets of
Company Quarters (frame) three store houses, the Corrall & the Ice house
have been taken down and about half the lumbers hauld to the river bank &
piled up. The well has been dug eight feet deep, one third of the trench in
which the new stockade is to be planted has been dug. Fifty two tons of
freight have been shipped to Benton…There still remains the following
building to be taken down; all the officers quarters, two sets of Camp Quarters
(one adobe & one frame) one Storehouse, the Officers, Guardhouse, Magazine
& Bake House. I would respectfully request to be informed whether the
unserviceable horses and mules are to be left at Camp Cooke with the other
unserviceable stores, or taken to Benton. 102
Another post, Camp Baker, opened in November 1869 with the assignment of
guarding the mail route between Fort Benton and Helena. Located on the road near
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present-day White Sulfur Springs, it quickly took over Camp Cooke’s patrol duties,
further adding nails into Camp Cooke’s coffin. Local calls for protection became the last
duties for the post.
One last patrol remained. In late December, a local civilian called upon
Lieutenant Auman for assistance. A raiding party of Indians was committing
“depredations” about twelve miles below the post. A patrol from Camp Cooke chased
the Indians into the mountains where they barricaded themselves into rocks and fired
rifles and pistols down upon the soldiers. A report to Lieutenant Auman said that two of
the Indians had fallen wounded from the rocks, but the remainder of the party had lodged
themselves too well in the rocks for the soldiers to approach them. They returned to the
post that night and attempted the next day to find the Indians and the stolen horses and
supplies, but were unable to follow the trail due to blowing snow filling in their tracks.
The last official document pertaining to Camp Cooke was the order closing the
post.
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Figure 21. General Orders No. 23 Headquarters, Dept. of Dakota, giving
Instructions for closing Camp Cooke in March 1870.
Microfilm obtained through National Archives Washington, D.C
Following the publishing of this order, the Post Surgeon wrote in his journal:
“It is to be assumed that the above order is sufficient to authorize the closing
of the Medical History of the Post of Camp Cooke M.T.
R.N. Whitefoot
Actg. Asst. Surgeon USA”

Near the end of March 1870, ads appeared in Montana Territorial newspapers.
The Army would hold these auctions on Camp Cooke’s site to sell various items of
military equipment remaining at the post.
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Figure 22. Advertisement from Helena Daily Herald Newspaper, March 28,
1870, for auction of goods at Camp Cooke site - Microfilm
obtained through Idaho State Archives Boise, Idaho.
With the final dismantling of the post and the auctions of the materials, all
vestiges of the U.S. Army at the Mouth of the Judith River effectively ended. No one
seemed to mourn its departure and the memory of the post on the Judith River of
Montana faded into history.
As the soldiers left Camp Cooke and headed to the new post to be established at
Fort Benton, there could be little doubt that they looked upon this move with relief and
some joy. The years at Camp Cooke had been ones of solitude and fear. Located nearly
one hundred miles from the nearest town, they had suffered the attacks of the Indians, but
more than that – and perhaps more difficult to bear – were the constant harsh and cruel
attacks laid upon them by the people and the press of the territorial newspapers. There
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was little doubt that Camp Cooke had been built at the wrong place. After the departure
of the army, there were no regrets and no one questioned or regretted their departure.
Even the signs of their existence faded as the years passed.
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CONCLUSION:
CAMP COOKE: A MILITARY FAILURE OR UNCREDITED SUCCESS?
The concept of a web of military posts across the west may have been a wellconceived plan, but the implementation and follow-through failed to live up to
expectations with the location of Camp Cooke in the Montana Territory. The Army built
this post in an area even the local inhabitants called the “Badlands.” It was improperly
placed and ultimately it failed to perform a majority of the tasks with which it had been
originally assigned to accomplish.
Camp Cooke must be looked upon as both a failure and a success. The placement
of the post on the banks of the Missouri River nearly 100 miles from the closest city of
importance was an error. On more than one occasion, it was noted that a proper patrol or
pursuit could not be mounted due to the lack of enough healthy and rider-broken horses
being available. As other posts began to be built in the territory, troops left Camp Cooke
to serve as these new forts. Replacements were not forthcoming to the post on the Judith
River. By late in 1868, less than one hundred men still served at Camp Cooke. With
these other posts staffed and performing their duties, both carrying a full complement of
cavalry, Camp Cooke became irrelevant.
Many posts became an integral part of the communities around them. Camp
Cooke was nearly one hundred miles from the nearest town. That isolation became the
focus of the anger displayed by the citizens in the Montana Territory for Camp Cooke’s
inability to respond in what they felt a timely manner to Indian incidents.
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The reality is that Camp Cooke was different from other military posts in the west
for many reasons.
While many military posts in the west were a part of battles in the Indian Wars,
facing a fear of attack on a regular basis, Camp Cooke was one of only three posts in the
west that actually did experience a frontal attack. The “John Wayne” image of Indians in
feathers charging Fort Apache was a movie myth. At Camp Cooke, the women were
locked into the powder magazine, and they begged to be killed if the “savages” should
take the post. Other military posts did not have this history, which sat Camp Cooke
apart.
Soldiers at Camp Cooke could be trapped at the post for months after expired
enlistments. Not only did the lack of transportation from low water or a frozen river
maroon them but in its four years of operation, the paymaster made only three visits to
the post. It is not surprising then, that the commander of Camp Cooke reported an
alarming rate of desertion, particularly after those infrequent paydays. Soldiers were
unable to send money home or to maintain their own expenses. There was no bank at
Camp Cooke, thus security for their money was difficult. Other posts in the west
averaged paydays every three to six months. This again set Camp Cooke apart.
The Army built Camp Cooke, for the most part, of cottonwood logs with adobe
brick and roofs of earth and sod. Cottonwood is not a good building material. As the
wood dried out, it shrunk and gaps formed in the joints between the logs. Rats brought in
by the riverboats infested the post and began to take it over. Other posts complained of
spiders, ants, scorpions, or snakes. According to several reports, Camp Cooke was
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literally being eaten by rats. Huge quantities of food and clothing items were being
destroyed. The rat invasion was another example that set Camp Cooke apart from other
posts.
The military built Camp Cooke in the wrong place to support the Montana
citizens and failed to give it the proper opportunities for success. It is possible Major
William Clinton, first commander of the post, was so driven that he damaged his own
men and the morale of Camp Cooke so intensely its success was doomed. In 1870, when
the Army finally closed Camp Cooke there was no one who mourned and within a few
years there were few who even remembered it had existed.
Perhaps, its most successful achievement was to provide the springboard from
which other posts in the Montana Territory ultimately arose. Camp Cooke also
established mail and stage routes. With mail coming in from the states on riverboats,
Fort Benton was the major entry point. Soldiers from Camp Cooke guarded the roads
between Fort Benton and Helena. Soldiers from Camp Cooke were instrumental in
building Fort Shaw, in the Sun River area and later Fort Ellis in the Gallatin River Valley,
near present-day Bozeman. These were major accomplishments in the settling of the
Montana Territory, though Camp Cooke received no credit for helping with these
assignments. With its location on the Missouri River at the Judith, and Camp Reeve’s
placement on the Musselshell during the summer of 1868, the 13th Infantry acted as a
deterrent to Indian attacks on the riverboats traversing the Missouri.
Camp Cooke, although considered a failure, the story of its communication and
stabilization successes needs to be told. Michael Koury in Military Posts of Montana
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wrote three pages on Camp Cooke. In his book, Old Forts of the Northwest, Herbert M.
Hart included two pages on this military post. Newton Carl Abbott’s book, Montana In
The Making, actually had completely erroneous information when it stated, “…Camp
Cook established at the mouth of the Judith River in 1867 and abandoned in the next
year…”103 In this brief account of the post, the name was even spelled incorrectly.
Merrill Burlingame’s book, The Montana Frontier, devoted only two sentences to Camp
Cooke. A newspaper supplement of the Lewiston News Argus dated December 1976,
commenting in an article titled “Many Historical Sites at Mouth of Judith River,” said the
cemetery had washed away with changes in the course of the Judith. Now, in honor of
the soldiers who served at Camp Cooke, and those who gave their lives there, perhaps a
portion of their story has been told.

103

Abbott, Newton Carl, 1939, Montana In The Making,(Billings, MT. Gazette Printing Company,
1939) page 334

113

BIBLIOGRAPHY
MATERIALS RECEIVED FROM NATIONAL ARCHIVES
Court Martial Records: Camp Cooke, Montana Territory
DeMars, Joseph, Private, 13th Infantry, Company A, Camp Cooke, Montana
Territory, 08/1866 – 08/1866, Record Group 153, ARC Identifier 1888768,
Local Identifier 00-2191, MLR Number PC 29 15A, PC 29 15B.
Dunn, Patrick, Private, 13th Infantry, Company A, Camp Cooke, Montana
Territory, 08/1866 – 08/1866, Record Group 153, ARC Identifier 1888769,
Local Identifier 00-2191, MLR Number PC 29 15A, PC 29 15B.
Hansard, Peter. Private, 13th Infantry, Company H, Camp Cooke, Montana
Territory, 06/1866 – 06/1866, Record Group 153, ARC Identifier 1888770,
Local Identifier 00-2191, MLR Number PC 29 15A, PC 29 15B.
Horrigan, Patrick W., – 1st Lt., 13th Infantry, 02/1868 - 02/1868: Record Group
153. ARC Identifier 1898340, Local Identifier 00-3359 / MLR Number PC
29 15A, PC 29 15 B.
Ide, William C., - Captain, 13th Infantry, 01/1867 – 01/1867, Record Group 153,
ARC Identifier 1495754, Local Identifier 00-2931 / MLR Number PC 29
15A, PC 29 15B.
Reid, W.F., Sergeant, 13th Infantry, Company D, Camp Cooke, Montana
Territory, 08/1866 – 08/1866, Record Group 153, ARC Identifier 1888771,
Local Identifier 00-2191 / MLR Number PC 29 15A, PC 1 5B.
Shumate, Hiram, Private, 13th Infantry, Company C, Camp Cooke, Montana
Territory, 08/1866 – 08/1866, Record Group 153, ARC Identifier 1888772.
Local Identifier 00-2191, MLR Number PC 29 15A, PC 29 15.
Thompson, George, Private, 13th Infantry, Company G, Camp Cooke, Montana
Territory, 08/1867 – 08/1867, Record Group 153, ARC Identifier 1888773,
Local Identifier 00-2191, MLR Number PC 29 15A, PC 29 15B.
Trihy, David, Private, 13th Infantry, Company H, Camp Cooke, Montana
Territory, 08/1866 – 08/1866, Record Group 153. ARC Identifier 1888772,

114

Local Identifier 00-2191, MLR Number PC 29 15A, PC 29 15B.
Trihy, David, Private, 13th Infantry, Company H, Camp Cooke, Montana
Territory, 07/1867 – 07/1867, Record Group 153, ARC Identifier 1892437,
Local Identifier 002725, MLR Number PC29 15A, PC 29 15B.

Personnel Records for:
DeCourcy, Ferdinand E. Military Papers. Record Group 94, Entry 297, 5810
[ACP] 1876 (9W3/18/10E) Box #425, National Archives. Washington D.C.
Reeve, Isaac V.D. Col., United States Army, 13th Infantry/22nd Infantry, Microfiche
Publication M1395, Fiche ACP 000287, Record Group 94, Entry 294, ACP
1891, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
Shaw, Robert G., United States Army, Colored Troops File, Letters Received, Record
Group 94, Entry 360, 9W3/221/B, Box 203, National Archives, Washington
D.C.
Shaw, Robert G., Col., 54th Massachusetts Infantry, Record and Pensions File,
Record Group 94, Entry 501, #443411, EW3/16/16/C, Box #631, National
Archives, Washington, D.C.

Post Records and Reports
Endorsements Sent and Received: Camp Cooke, Montana Territory. Record
Group 393. ARC Identifier 657000, MLR # A1-5 92 -2. National Archives.
Washington D.C.
List of Civilians Living at or in the Vicinity of the Post, Compiled 3/1/1869,
Camp Cooke, Montana Territory, Record Group 393, ARC Identifier
657008, MLR #A1 -5 92 -8, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
General Orders, Special Orders and Circulars, Camp Cooke, Montana Territory,
Record Group 393, ARC Identifier 657000, MLR #A1-5 92-4, National
Archives, Washington, D.C.
Proceedings of Boards of Survey, 10/1866 – 11/1868, Camp Cooke, Montana
Territory, Group 393, ARC Identifier 657007, MLR #A1-5 92-3.
National Archives, Washington, D.C.

115

Records Relating to Deaths and Internments, Camp Cooke, Montana Territory,
Record Group 393, ARC Identifier 657006, MLR #A1-5 – 92-7.
National Archives, Washington, D.C.
Special Orders, 7/11/1866 – 3/31/1870, Camp Cooke, Montana Territory,
Record Group 393, ARC Identifier 637004, MLR #A1-5 92-5, National
Archives, Washington, D.C.

LETTERS
Received from Montana State Historical Society
Lt. Martin E. Hogan to Andrew O’Connell, July 21, 1866, DonoghueMontgomery Collection, Montana Historical Society, Helena MT:
Collection No. SC 864.
Lt. Martin E. Hogan to Andrew O’Connell, August 25, 1966, DonoghueMontgomery Collection, Montana Historical Society, Helena MT:
Collection No. SC 864.
Lt. Martin E. Hogan to Andrew O’Connell, September 7, 1866, DonoghueMontgomery Collection, Montana Historical Society, Helena MT:
Collection No. SC 864.
Lt. Martin E. Hogan to Andrew O’Connell, January 6, 1867, DonoghueMontgomery Collection, Montana Historical Society, Helena MT:
Collection No. SC 864.
Mrs. Kate Hogan to Father and Mother, June 30, 1867, Donoghue-Montgomery
Collection, Montana Historical Society, Helena MT: Collection No. SC
864.
Lt. Martin E. Hogan to S. H. Hershfield, Helena Montana., July 8, 1867,
Donoghue-Montgomery Collection, Montana Historical Society, Helena
MT: Collection No. SC 864

Received from North Dakota Historical Society
Canfield, Andrew. Andrew Nahum Canfield Papers, 1868. 20005. 1r/#1071
State Historical Society of North Dakota Bismarck, ND.

116

BOOKS

Abbott, Newton Carl, Montana In The Making, (Billings, MT: Gazette Printing
Company, 1939) pg 334
Althern, Robert G. William Tecumseh Sherman and the Settlement of the West (Norman,
OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956).
Barbour, Barton H. Fort Union and the Upper Missouri Fur Trade, (Norman OK:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991)
Boatner, Mark Mayo III. The Civil War Dictionary (New York: David McKay
Company, Inc., 1959).
Bureau of Land Management, Highlights of the Upper Missouri National Wild &
Scenic River Lewis & Clark National Historic Trail, (Lewistown (MT) District
Office Lewistown MT: BLM-MT-AE-84-020-4333, pages 7-12).
Burlingame, Merill G. The Montana Frontier (Helena, MT: State Publishing Co., 1942).
Chittenden, Hiram Martin. History of Early Steamboat Navigation on the Missouri River,
(New York, Francis P. Harper, 1902)
Cooke, Philip St. George. Cavalry Tactics or Regulations for The Instruction,
Formations, and Movements of The Cavalry of the Army and Volunteers
Of the United States (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1862).
(Reprint of 1862 Edition by Stackpole Press Mechanicsburg, PA: 2004)
Eales, Anne Bruner. Army Wives on the American Frontier: Living by the Bugles
(Boulder CO: Johnson Printing, 1996).
Field, Ron. Forts of the American Frontier 1820-91 – Central and Northern Plains
(Westminster MD: Osprey Press, 2005).
Filer, Barbara. Montana Mining Ghost Towns (Helena MT: Farcountry Press, 2002).
Smith, Sherry L. The View From Officer’s Row: Perceptions of Western Indians
(Tucson AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1991)
Gillis, Julia. So Far From Home An Army Bride on the Western Frontier 1865-1869
(Portland, OR: Oregon Historical Society Press, 1993).

117

Grant, Bruce. American Forts – Yesterday and Today (New York: E. P Dutton
Company, Inc., 1965).
Greene, Jerome A. Fort Randall on the Missouri, 1856-1892 (Pierre SD: South Dakota
Historical Society Press, 2005).
Greene, Jerome A. Indian War Veterans: Memories of Army Life and Campaigns in the
West, 1864-1898, Compiled and Edited by Jerome A. Greene (New York:
Savas Beatie Press. 2007).
Hagen, Barry J., C.S.C. “Exactly in the Right Place” A History of Fort C.F. Smith,
Montana Territory, 1866-1868 (El Segundo, CA: Upton & Sons Publishers.
1999).
Hart, Herbert M. Old Forts of the Northwest (Seattle WA: Superior Publication Co.,
1963).
Heidler, David Stephen, Jeanne Heidler and David Coles. Encyclopedia of the American
Civil War (New York: Norton Press, 2000).
Koury, Michael J. Military Posts of Montana (Bellevue NE: The Old Army Press,
1970).
Lewis, Meriwether, Clark, William. The Lewis and Clark Journals: an American
Epic of Discovery edited by Moulton, Gary E. (Lincoln, NE: University of
Nebraska Press, 2003).
Malone, Michael P., Richard B. Roeder and William L. Lang Montana: A History of
Two Centuries (Seattle WA: University of Washington Press, 1976)
McAlexander, U.G. History of the Thirteenth Regiment, United States Infantry
(Regimental Press, Thirteenth Infantry, Frank D. Gunn 1905)
Morgan, R. Kent. Our Hallowed Ground: Guide to Indian War Battlefield Locations In
Eastern Montana (Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2004).
Powell, William H. Officers of the Army and Navy, Regular Who Served in the Civil War
(Philadelphia, PA: Hamersly, 1892).
Report to The Secretary of War, being part of the Message and Documents
Communicated to the Two Houses of Congress at the Beginning of the Second
Session of the Forty-First Congress (Washington, D.C., Government Printing

118

Office, 1869)

Roe, Frances M. Army Letters From An Officer’s Wife (Lincoln, NE: University of
Nebraska Press, 1981).
Smith, Sherry L. The View From Officer’s Row: Perceptions of Western Indians
(Tucson AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1991)
Stuart, Granville. Forty Years on the Frontier, as Seen in the Journals and
Reminiscences of Granville Stuart Edited by Paul C. Phillips. (Lincoln NE:
University of Nebraska Press, 1977).
Thrapp, Don I. Encyclopedia of Frontier Biography (Glendale, CA: Bison
Books, 1991).
U.S. War Department, The 1863 Laws of War (Facsimile Edition, Mechanicsburg
PA. Stackpole Press, 2005)
Utley, Robert M. Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian,
1866-189 (Lincoln NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1984).
Vaughn, Robert Then and Now: Thirty-Six Years in the Rockies – 1864-1900
(Helena MT: Farcountry Press, 2001).
Walker, Dale. The Calamity Papers: Western Myths and Cold Cases (New
York: Tom Doherty, Assoc., 2004).
Whealdon, Ben L., et. al., “I Will be Meat for my Salish”: the Buffalo and the
Montana Writers Project, (Pablo MT: Salish Kootenai College, 2001) Pg. 223226
Wylie, Paul R. The Irish General: Thomas Francis Meagher (Norman OK:
University of Oklahoma Press, 2007).

ARTICLES
Alvarez, Gayle, “James Kephart, Medal of Honor Recipient Civil War” Pass In Review,
The Official Newsletter of the Idaho Military Historical Society and Museum
(December 2003) Pages 3-6

119

Athearn, Robert G. “Frontier Critics of the Western Army.” Montana, The
Magazine of Western History Vol. 15, No. 2 (Spring 1955): Pages 16-28
Athearn, Robert G. “General Sherman and the Montana Frontier.” Montana, The
Magazine of History Vol.2, No. 1 (Jan 1952): Pages 55-64
Canfield, Sarah E. “An Army Wife on the Upper Missouri (Diary 1866-1868)”
Edited by Ray A. Mattison. Bismarck ND. North Dakota History, Volume 20,
No. 4. Historical Society of North Dakota. (October 1953) Pages 191-220.
Coffman, Edward M. “Army Life on the Frontier 1865-1898.” Military Affairs
Vol. 20, No. 4. (Winter 1956): pages 103-201.
Ege, Robert J. “Bloody Camp Cooke, Montana’s First Outpost.” Real West
Magazine Vol. 12, No. 128 (February 1969): pages 31-34+.
Fisk, James L. St. Paul Weekly Press, October 25, 1866, Collections of the State
Historical Society of North Dakota, Bismarck, ND
McElroy, Harold L. “Mercurial Military: A Study of the Central Montana
Frontier Army Policy.” Montana, The Magazine of History Vol. 4, No. 4
(Autumn 1954): Pages 9-23.
Mentzer, Raymond A. Jr. “Camp Baker/Fort Logan: Microcosm of the Frontier
Military Experience.” Montana: The Magazine of Western History Vol.
27, No. 2 (Spring 1977): Pages 34-43.
Rickey, Don Jr. “The Enlisted Men of the Indian Wars.” Military Affairs Vol.
23, No.2 (Summer 1959): Pages 36-45
Twichel, Thomas E. “Fort Logan and the Urban Frontier.” Edited by Clinch,
Thomas A. Montana, The Magazine of Western History Vol. XVII, No. 4
(October 1967): Pages 44-49.
Welty, Raymond L. “The Policing of the Frontier by the Army, 1860-1870.”
Kansas Historical Quarterly Vol. VII, No. 3 (August 1938): Pages 246-257.
Welty, Raymond L. “Supplying the Frontier Military Posts.” Kansas Historical
Quarterly Vol. VII, No. 2 (May 1938): Pages 154-169.

120

121

122

123

124

125

126

